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Jacob Eisler* 
Partisan gerrymandering, the legislative practice of drawing electoral districts to benefit the party 
in power, is in the gunsights of election law reformers. While there is consensus that partisan 
gerrymandering can cause unfair representation, there has been fierce dispute over if the judiciary 
can effectively police it. A new generation of scholars, drawing heavily on quantitative methods, 
claims to have developed conclusive tests to identify partisan gerrymandering, and federal courts 
have applied these tests to strike down districting plans. However, this Article argues that the 
threat from partisan gerrymandering is illusory. Parties are responsive to external conditions, 
including the composition of legislative districts. Therefore, voters, candidates, and party leaders 
can adapt to compete for the constituencies of redrawn districts. When partisan gerrymandering 
appears harmful, the true culprit is the fracturing of the electorate due to voters’ underlying 
preferences. The appropriate forum for resolving such substantive disputes among citizens is 
democratic contestation, not rights-based judicial intervention. Subsequently, reformers’ hope 
that eliminating partisan gerrymandering will fix American democracy is misplaced. To challenge 
the prevalent view, this Article draws on social science analysis of political behavior, and offers a 
unified perspective on party affiliation, voter preference, and constitutional rights.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is a new dawn in the war against partisan gerrymandering.1 The practice, which allocates 
voters to representative districts by partisan identity to benefit the dominant party, is blamed for 
distorting electoral outcomes and making democracy less responsive to popular will.2 For decades, 
attempts to develop a test that courts could use to reliably identify partisan gerrymandering 
foundered. Tellingly, the dispositive Supreme Court case on the issue resulted in a badly 
fragmented bench, with a plurality of justices denying there could ever be a discernible standard 
for managing partisan gerrymandering, and the remaining justices disagreeing over what might be 
a valid test.3 However, innovative reformers finally claim that they can provide courts with the 
tools to identify, and, where appropriate, strike down politicized districting.4 This movement 
                                                 
1 See Whitford v. Gill, --- F.Supp.3d ---, No. 15-CV-421-BBC, 2016 WL 6837229 (W.D. Wis, Nov. 21, 2016); 
Raleigh Wake Citizens Assoc. v. Wake County Bd. Of Elections, 827 F.3d 333 (4th Cir. 2016); Shapiro v. McManus, 
--- F.Supp.3d ---, Nov 1:13-cv-03233-JKB, 2016 WL 4445320 (D. Maryland, Aug. 24, 2016). Appeals are likely to 
be heard before the Supreme Court in these cases. Joe Forward, Redistricting: Republican Maps Likely Headed to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, THE STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, Vol. 8, December 2016, available at 
http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/InsideTrack/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=8&Issue=23&ArticleID=25242. 
2 See, e.g., Daryl Levinson & Benjamin I. Sachs, Political Entrenchment and Public Law, 125 YALE L. J. 400, 416-
418 (2015) (classifying partisan gerrymandering as an entrenchment practice that operates by distorting electoral 
outcomes, and summarizing judicial and scholarly perspectives); Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: 
The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L. J. 491, 516 (1997) (characterizing partisan gerrymandering as “indefensibly 
anti-majoritarian”). 
3 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
4 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 831 (2015); Jowei Chen and Jonathan Rodden, Cutting Through the Thicket: Redistricting Simulations and 
the Detection of Partisan Gerrymanders, 14 ELECTION L. J. 331 (2015). Stephanopoulos has served as lead counsel 
for Whitford, and his work on the “efficiency gap” was cited in the case. Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229 at *4. Chen 
served as an expert witness for the plaintiff in Raleigh, and the district court’s failure to adequately consider his 
quantitative analysis was a central reason the 4th Circuit overturned the decision. 827 F.3d at 344. This trend may 
receive further momentum from the growing sense that party should be treated as a proxy for race in the defense of 
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would revolutionize the electoral landscape and solve one of the thorniest problems in modern 
constitutional jurisprudence.5 There is already celebration that this may mean the end of partisan 
gerrymandering and usher in an era of fair representation in American democracy.6 
This Article demonstrates that such a response to partisan gerrymandering would 
misinterpret constitutional rights, infringe popular political autonomy, and distort the conditions 
of democratic contestation. These conclusions derive from the nature of party identity as 
instrumental and fluid.7 Voters and politicians use parties to achieve their ultimate policy goals. 
Consequently, party platforms are determined by negotiation between these political actors, with 
each seeking the best possible satisfaction of its preferences.8 When the composition of a district 
shifts – including by partisan gerrymandering – the various actors should adapt by reconstituting 
their party coalitions to remain competitive.9 Parties alter their platforms to try to secure a majority 
of voters in as many districts as possible, while each voter considers which party should best satisfy 
                                                 
election law rights, including protection against harmful districting. See Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party, Party as 
Race, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 
58 WM. & MARY L. REV. at 36 (forthcoming 2018) (interim working draft, Feb. 6 2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers2.cfm?abstract_id=2912403 (“Recent experience with the race or party problem 
is causing me to [think] it certainly seems a more sensible approach to police partisanship in redistricting directly….”). 
5 This thorniness is expressed by the plurality opinion in Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281 (2004) (“no judicially discernible 
and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged”).  
6 See, e.g., Mark Joseph Stern, Death to the Gerrymander, SLATE, Jan. 9, 2017, available at  
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2017/01/death_to_the_gerrymander_paul_smith_mi
ght_defeat_unconstitutional_redistricting.html; Ian Millhiser, One of the biggest legal guns in the country is coming 
for partisan gerrymandering, THINKPROGRESS, Jan. 4, 2017, available at  
https://thinkprogress.org/one-of-the-biggest-legal-guns-in-the-country-is-coming-for-partisan-gerrymandering-
4e6d3a0385fe#.n0qj68vet.  
7 This view is commonly accepted in American political science. See, e.g., ANGUS CAMPBELL ET. AL., ELECTIONS AND 
THE POLITICAL ORDER (1966) 162 (building on the theory of ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF 
DEMOCRACY (1957) to offer a classic account of the spatial model). 
8 This observation is analyzed extensively in Section II.B.1 infra. 
9 Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 600 (2002) (arguing that 
partisan gerrymandering can be a practice that inhibits “accountability to shifting voter preferences”). The argument 
of this Article is that, at root, it is not districting that can inhibit such accountability, but other features or conditions 
in an electoral dynamic. See generally Michael Kang, Race and Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L. J. 734, 738-
39 (2008) (observing that electoral competition is only one form of competition by which political allegiances and 
thereby political outcomes may be achieved). 
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the voter’s preferences in the new political landscape. Given this dynamic, politicized districting 
merely reshuffles the electorate, inducing a round of adaptation and compromise.  
While the realities of politics are not always conducive to efficient adaptation, politicized 
districting itself does not cause harm to representation. This article identifies two conditions that 
can impair adaptation, and make the effects of partisan gerrymandering an intermediate symptom 
of political pathology. The first such condition is strong first-order attachment by voters to parties 
(partisan loyalty). The second is clustering of voter preferences such that voters naturally fall into 
antagonistic groups (preference bundling). Either of these circumstances can hamper 
rearrangement of party coalitions following a partisan gerrymander, and allow political elites to 
exploit the practice to entrench themselves.10 Both party loyalty and preference bundling, however, 
are substantive political realities, and properly resolved by electoral, rather than judicial, action.11 
The reciprocal relationship between party instrumentality, political adaptation, and 
substantive politics explains why the judiciary has repeatedly misfired in its attempts to articulate 
a coherent rights-based law of partisan gerrymandering. When courts prohibit consideration of 
party identity in districting, they fix the geographic constituencies of parties, and thereby 
artificially constrain party identity itself. Without a clear constitutional mandate, such judicial 
enforcement of the terms of popular political engagement intrusively restricts voter control over 
                                                 
10 This analysis clarifies how partisan gerrymandering can be used as a tool for elite entrenchment. See, e.g., 
Issacharoff, supra note 9; Samuel Issacharoff and Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: Judicial Review of 
Partisan Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (2004). See generally Such problems of elite domination pose a 
general obstacle to democratic rule. See, generally Levinson & Sachs, supra note 2, at 407 (describing the character 
of entrenchment as a practice, and observing it can either occur through legal means or functional means, and 
suggesting partisan gerrymandering is a form of functional/electoral entrenchment); BERNARD MANIN, THE 
PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 207 (1997) (describing the problem of elite control of representative 
apparatus); MARTY COHEN ET AL., THE PARTY DECIDES 13, 187 (2008) (describing the role of elite-driven “invisible 
primaries” in selecting candidates). Cf. Samuel Issacharoff, Outsourcing Politics: The Hostile Takeovers of Our 
Hollowed Out Political Parties, __ HOUS. L. REV. ___ (2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2888064 (arguing that parties no longer have the same level of 
control over their apparatus, and seemingly mourning this in part, because parties “are complex institutional actors 
that play an essential coordinating role in politics”). 
11 See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 101 (1980) (the constitution protects processes, not outcomes).  
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democratic contestation.12 This effect raises deeper normative concerns about judicial interference 
with democratic self-determination. Consequently, such determinations by courts elicit the 
political question doctrine with regards to the proper reach of judicial power, which has haunted 
contemporary partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence.13  
 The malleability of party identity and its implications for rights-based judicial intervention 
have been underappreciated by scholars and commentators. This Article seeks to fill this lacuna. 
It 1) demonstrates how political adaptation undermines the case against litigating partisan 
gerrymandering and 2) provides a framework for understanding the democratic maladies for which 
partisan gerrymandering is typically blamed. More generally, it cautions against the impulse to use 
individual rights jurisprudence to solve deeply rooted political crises.14  
The Article begins with a brief recap of the contemporary partisan gerrymandering 
jurisprudence, as Section I focuses on Davis v. Bandemer,15 Vieth v. Jubelirer,16 and the most 
noteworthy cases currently at play in the federal system. The Article then explores the initial 
challenges facing the treatment of partisan gerrymandering as a rights violation given the 
flexibility of parties.  
                                                 
12 See Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 
COLUM. L. REV. 1325, 1330 (1987) (counselling against “even…limited intervention because the available judicial 
remedies would almost certainly create grave political and constitutional risks.”); Nathaniel Persily, Reply: In 
Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting 
Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 667 (2002) (questioning if the benefit conferred by gerrymandering justifies 
“judicial intrusion into politics”, and that such a principle would result in extraordinarily judicial overreach). 
13 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277-78 (in addition to the problem of manageable standards, partisan gerrymandering seems to 
evoke question of the appropriate political department and the question of if the issue at stake is a policy 
determination).  
14 Thus this article is concerned with “justifiability of standards” rather than “consistency of results”. Rick Hasen, 
Looking for Standards (in All the Wrong Places): Partisan Gerrymandering Claims after Vieth, 3 ELEC. L. J. 626, 635 
(2004). It is possible (and in vogue) to use metrical analysis to ensure consistency of results by some objective 
standard; but if that objective standard serves neither a logic of rights nor a deeper political logic, it is irrelevant. 
15 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
16 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
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Section II turns to the structural problems facing judicial management of partisan 
gerrymanders. It offers two models – an exemplary thought experiment, and a formula that aspires 
to capture central aspects of voter-party relations17 – to demonstrate that the reactions to partisan 
gerrymandering can in principle be fully managed by adaptation by political actors, and may, in 
certain circumstances, prove beneficial. To support this analysis, the article relies on methods and 
interpretations used in the social sciences to predict how parties and citizens behave when 
struggling for political power. 
Section III considers what conditions may inhibit adaptation to partisan gerrymandering. 
The Article identifies partisan loyalty and bundled preferences as the two primary ‘spoilers’ that 
can result in partisan gerrymanders harming realization of electoral will. These ‘spoilers’ provide 
an effective lens for understanding the long-running disputes over partisan gerrymandering in both 
the legal scholarship and the courts.  
Section IV considers rights-based understanding of party identity in the context of the 
Article’s structural observations. It observes, in particular, that judicial intervention to protect 
partisan identity might enforce artificial baselines for the shifting network of voter allegiances and 
party platforms. Unless a substantive analysis of voter preference is incorporated into any test, 
deeming partisan gerrymandering justiciable would comprise a uniquely political type of judicial 
intervention. In particular, it would artificially fix the terms by which parties determine their 
constituencies and platforms. The Article finally observes that when in the past courts have 
engaged in such aggressive forays into politics, they have frequently ended poorly. 
                                                 
17 This Article looks to a question posed in Samuel Issacharoff and Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets: Partisan 
Lockups of Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 681, by offering a model of “partisan political competition.” 
(The article has been described by another leading election law scholar as “the finest article written in the field,” 
Heather K. Gerken, Playing Cards in a Hurricane: Party Reform in an Age of Polarization, __ HOUS. L. REV. ___ 
(2017), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893745). In order to do so it must make 
certain simplifying assumptions – particularly through ignoring transaction costs of coalition coordination – but at 
least, under certain constraints, solves a part of the puzzle. 
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This Article is ideological in neither its motivation nor its analysis. It is driven by two 
concerns: the strange failure of lawyers and scholars to appreciate how reallocation of voters into 
different districts alone cannot harm party efficacy; and the lack of rigorous consideration 
regarding what judicial intervention into substantive politics that would entail. This Article thereby 
seeks to dispel the myth that judicial regulation of partisan gerrymandering will fix the crisis of 
representative accountability.  
I. PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE CHARACTER OF PARTIES 
This Section offers an overview of the state of the law, and describes some of the initial 
challenges that face management of partisan gerrymandering through a rights framework. The 
responsive and instrumental traits of party identity obscure what voter rights are harmed by 
partisan districting. These challenges explain both the tangled law on partisan gerrymandering, 
and the difficulty courts have faced in trying to address it. 
A. A Brief History of the Law of Partisan Gerrymandering 
The partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence has a terse but tangled legacy.18 It is among the 
most hotly contested results of the Court’s conclusion that it should protect “fair representation.”19 
Fair representation is crucial to legitimate political process, specifically the sufficient opportunity 
                                                 
18 The path of the case law has been well covered elsewhere. For a detailed blackletter review, see Whitford, 2016 WL 
6837229 at 21-36 (summarizing all Supreme Court opinions, concurrences, and dissents directly bearing on partisan 
gerrymandering from Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) through League of United Latin American Citizens 
v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (hereinafter, LULAC). See also generally Mitchell N. Berman, Managing 
Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 785-809 (2005) (providing an extensive overview of partisan gerrymandering 
from the Court’s first foray into substantive election law through Vieth, with a detailed analysis of each Vieth opinion). 
19 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 123. That partisan gerrymandering is about principles of fair representation proved a popular 
academic lens for partisan gerrymandering prior to the emergence of the ‘metricizing’ tendency to resolve the 
justiciability question (a pivot that may have occurred in response to the Vieth plurality refocusing the analysis towards 
question of lack of manageable standards, 541 U.S. at 281). See, e.g., Heather Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: 
The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal Interregnum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503, 508 (2004) (suggesting that 
resolving partisan gerrymandering requires a “theory of representation”); Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Doing Our Politics 
in Court: Gerrymandering, “Fair Representation”, and an Exegesis into the Judicial Role, 78 N. D. L. REV. 527, 529 
(2003) (characterizing the post-Baker election jurisprudence as enquiring into “full and effective representation” as 
opposed to just procedures of vote tabulation).  
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of citizens in a republic to determine policy outcomes through selection of representatives.20 In the 
context of districting, fair representation can be infringed when the allocation of voters to districts 
means each citizen’s vote does not have equal weight in the electoral selection process.21 The most 
unequivocal form of such a violation is allocation of voters to districts in unequal numbers, thereby 
violating one-person one-vote.22 The other well-established form of such violation is allocation of 
voters to districts by race.23 Both types of this impairment of representation through districting can 
be readily classified as a violation of equal protection – voters who suffer such treatment have 
inferior voting rights.  
The Court indicated that partisan gerrymandering comprises a wrong appropriately 
addressed by judicial intervention in Davis v. Bandemer, but left unclear when courts should find 
it illegal. While the Bandemer plurality focused on such politicized districting as a wrong best 
understood under the vote dilution framework, it provided little guidance as to when such vote 
dilution would comprise a material violation of individual rights.24 18 years later, Vieth v. Jubelirer 
                                                 
20 One challenge to this enquiry is that just representation itself is a theoretically “deep” concept requiring both a set 
of normative assumptions (about fair politics) and descriptive assumptions (about human nature). See generally 
HANNAH FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967) (offering an influential analysis of the role of 
representation, particularly the mandate-trustee dispute); Manin, supra note 10, (offering both a historically grounded 
taxonomy of approaches to representation); see also Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 18, at 545 (“questions of democratic 
theory are both complex and often intractable”).  
21 For a general description of how vote dilution operates (albeit oriented towards the race rather than partisan 
gerrymandering context), see Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1663, 1671-72 (2001) (when voters are polarized around candidates and districts arranged to exploit this polarization, 
voters can be arranged into districts to have inferior power). 
22 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). See generally BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 55 
(1984) (offering an overview of the early and foundational jurisprudence). Others have questioned if the formulaic 
simplicity of one-person one-vote conceals unaddressed normative questions. See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 18, at 
529 (the rule is formulaic); Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantra in Need of Meaning, 80 N. C. L. REV. 
1269, 1286 (2002) (observing that equality in number of voters per representative does not mean equal power of 
votes). However, these problems exist at a higher level of abstraction than the problem with conceptualizing of partisan 
gerrymandering defined in this Article. 
23 See generally Gerken, supra note 19; Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War with Itself – Social 
Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N. C. L. REV. 1517, 1539-41 (2002) (observing the conflict between the 
Voting Right Act’s § 2 prohibition of voting practices that discriminate on the basis of race, including vote dilution, 
and the mandate in Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) to satisfy strict scrutiny when using any racial classification in 
districting). 
24 The nearest thing offered by a formula in Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 128, 133 is the following:  
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further scrambled the jurisprudence through a split decision:25 a plurality of four conservative 
justices deemed partisan gerrymandering to be generally non-justiciable for lack of a viable test;26 
four liberal justices, in a set of fragmented dissents, declared partisan gerrymandering justiciable 
and the case at hand a violation, and offered a diverse set of tests for identifying when it comprised 
a constitutional wrong;27 and the swing vote, Justice Kennedy, did not find the case at hand a 
violation (or offer a clear standard), but refused to categorically find the practice non-justiciable. 
Further muddying the waters, Justice Kennedy suggested that an approach that focused on the First 
Amendment might offer a more promising path forward than the right to an undiluted vote 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment (the basis for finding districting illicit in the existing 
jurisprudence).28 
                                                 
 
[P]laintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable political 
group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group…[A]n equal protection violation may be 
found only where the electoral system substantially disadvantages certain voters in their opportunity 
to influence the political process effectively. In this context, such a finding of unconstitutionality 
must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters or 
effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process. 
 
As the Vieth plurality observes, 541 U.S. at 287, this is a “vague test” that gives little guidance regarding actual 
discriminatory effect (Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129, concluded that proving intent is not especially challenging). This 
can be traced to the Bandemer plurality’s reliance on underinformed concepts. See Schuck, supra note 12; Fuentes-
Rohwer, supra note 18.  
25 For a detailed critical review of each of the Vieth opinions, see Hasen, supra note 14; Berman, supra note 18. 
26 541 U.S. at 281 (“no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering 
claims have emerged. Lacking them, we must conclude that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable”).  
27 541 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J. dissenting) (arguing the standard of the Shaw cases should be applied and politicized 
district lines invalidated when “partisan considerations [] dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all neutral 
principles”); id. at 345-46 (Souter, J., dissenting) (making a “fresh start” and innovating a test derived from the burden-
shifting test used to assess discrimination on a protected category in the employment context from McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)); id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (identifying, at a minimum, unjustified 
entrenchment – “in which a party that enjoys only minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to 
take, and hold, legislative power…purely [as] the result of partisan manipulation” – indicative of justiciable partisan 
gerrymandering). As described in Section III.B.1.b, the conceptions of Stevens and Souter analogize partisan identity 
to race; the function of this to entire Article is to assuage Breyer’s anxieties regarding the ability of partisan 
gerrymandering to be the true source of entrenchment (thus entrenchment must inevitably be attributed to “‘other’ 
factors,” id.). 
28 Id. at 311 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“That no such standard [for assessing partisan gerrymandering] has emerged 
in this case should not be taken to prove that none will emerge in the future…The First Amendment may be the more 
relevant constitutional provision in future cases”).  
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In light of the deeply fragmented and increasingly fractious politics in the contemporary 
United States, there has been a resurgent interest in partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence, with 
those arguing for its illegality offering a number of arguments in lower federal courts. In Whitford, 
the case that has attracted the most attention, the majority relied on both First Amendment 
associational rights and the Equal Protection Clause to deem a severe partisan gerrymander 
unconstitutional discrimination.29 The district court suggested the sine qua non of illegality of 
politics in districting is “abuse of power”, marked by “absence of any relationship to a legitimate 
legislative objective,” itself marked by “excessiveness” that demonstrates “an intent to entrench a 
political party in power.”30 To identify where this point of excessiveness is reached, the court relied 
on the novel efficiency gap metric,31 which tests the severity of a partisan gerrymander. However, 
neither the Court nor the efficiency gap metric adverts to a principle theory of representation to 
explain why or when a particular degree of partisanship marks illegitimate legislative action. As 
demonstrated passim, the negative impacts of partisan action can be traced to substantive politics; 
neither the efficiency gap nor any other proposed metric explains the relationship between a given 
level of politicized districting it identifies and these substantive political conditions. 
This emphasis on quantitative analysis of politicized district to guide legal enquiries is a 
common feature of the current district court cases. This trend suggests that a partisan districting 
should be illegal when certain tangible and objective thresholds are breached.32 Other district court 
                                                 
29 2016 WL 6837229 at 33 (right to association protected by the First Amendment); 36 (the significance of the equal 
protection clause). 
30 Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229 at 36-38. 
31 Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229 at 50. The efficiency gap test is enumerated in Stephanopolous and McGhee, supra 
note 4, at 851 (the formula is the number of parties respective ‘wasted’ votes (defined as those votes cast for a losing 
candidate, or for a victorious candidate by in excess needed for victory) divided by the total number of votes cast in 
the election).  
32 The court of appeals founded its reversal of a district court dismissal in Raleigh Wake Citizens Association, 827 
F.3d 333, 344-45 (2016), on a conclusion that the court had failed to properly consider expert testimony. This 
testimony asserted, through use of computer simulations to randomly generate alternate districts based on traditional 
redistricting criteria, that the districting at issue could only be the product of partisan bias. Cf. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 
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innovations have relied on the First Amendment rights, buttressed by Justice Kennedy’s 
approbation of that path, to deem partisan gerrymandering justiciable, but have left unsettled the 
precise degree of politicized districting that will render a plan illegal.33 
B. Political Questions and Politicized Districting 
The attempt to clarify the rights-based legality of partisan gerrymandering through 
quantitative metrics obscures the conceptual complexity of the practice. The overarching question 
is if partisan gerrymandering is justiciable by the lights of the political question doctrine, which 
requires, inter alia,34 that the Court only resolve disputes that can be managed by a “judicially 
discernable and manageable standard.”35 The conservatives in Vieth argued that no court 
(including the liberal dissenters in Vieth) has offered a unified or coherent test for when partisan 
gerrymandering reaches the point of constitutional violation;36 defenders of the justiciability of the 
practice have argued that since Baker it has been the remit of  the Court to protect the right to fair 
representation.37 The deeper question, however, is not if partisan districting occurs, or what degree 
of severity makes it illegal, but rather if such allocation of voters to districts on the basis of partisan 
identity impairs “fair representation” in a manner that violates a protected right. 
                                                 
419 (describing Justice Kennedy’s skepticism towards the partisan symmetry quantification standard for testing 
partisan gerrymandering); id. at 466 (describing Stevens’ approval of the same standard); Bernard Grofman and Gary 
King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 
ELEC. L. J. 1 (2007) (describing the partisan symmetry test in detail). The analysis of Grofman and King presumes the 
static character of party identity, a feature more fully analysed as undergirding the liberal view of partisan 
gerrymandering in Section III.B.1.b infra. 
33 See Shapiro v. McManus, 2016 WL 4445320 at 9-11. The First Amendment associational approach to partisan 
gerrymandering is addressed more thoroughly in Section III.B.2.b infra. See also Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229, at 33. 
Shapiro and Whitford drew in particular from the First Amendment associational rights in politics established by 
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 870 (identifying associational rights in ballot access cases), so this Article focuses 
on the associational right as the general basis for the political right. For a full analysis of this point, see generally 
Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting is Association, 43 Fl. St. L. Rev. 763 (2016).  
34 This is the prong of the political question doctrine that has been the crux of the debate since Vieth; for the full test, 
see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  
35 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 121-22; Vieth, 541 at 277-78. 
36 Id. at 280. 
37 See Bandemer, 478 at 122-23; see also supra note 22. 
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Given the Court’s constitutional mandate, the justiciability query necessarily devolves into 
questions about rights: is a legally protected right infringed when voters are allocated into districts 
by partisan identity, and can such a right be coherently protected by the courts? Two 
understandings of this voter right have had resilience:38 the right not to suffer illegitimately 
discriminatory government action, guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause and understood in 
the districting context as a right to an undiluted vote;39 and the right, protected by the First 
Amendment to form associations free from governmental interference.40 The justiciability 
question could be answered in the affirmative – and thus partisan gerrymandering regulated by the 
Courts – if either of these rights could be used to consistently identify when politicized districting 
illegitimately impairs voters’ right to fair representation. 
Both approaches require that voters’ affiliation with a political party stand as firm and 
meaningful enough to validate protection by the given rights framework. In the case of vote 
dilution, voters only suffer the harm of less meaningful votes on the basis of partisan 
gerrymandering if the significance of their votes can be impaired due to their affiliation with the 
disadvantaged party.41 Likewise, voters only suffer associational harms on the basis of partisan 
gerrymandering if their ability to form associational groups is harmed when district lines are 
redrawn taking party identity into account. 
If partisan gerrymandering is to be found justiciable, it must be because courts can 
consistently identify when voters suffer as a result of being shifted among districts on account of 
                                                 
38 Interestingly, none of the innovations offered by the Vieth dissents, supra note 27, have become engines for the 
current round of partisan gerrymandering litigation. 
39 See generally Gerken, supra note 21; see also Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229 at 70 (observing the harm at issue is 
“the ability of Democrats to translate their votes into seats”). 
40 See Tokaji, supra note 33; see generally John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of 
Association, 43 CONN. L. REV. 149, 155 (2010).   
41 See Gerken, supra note 21, at 1703 (the injury of vote dilution falls on all voters in the protected class, “regardless 
of where they live.”). 
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party affiliation. The most well-established context in which allocating voters to districts on 
account of their attributes inflicts a wrong is racial gerrymandering. There, however, the 
deprivation is palpable: racial minorities can be fenced into geographical distributions that are 
disadvantageous vis-à-vis these immutable attributes, producing an insoluble unfairness.42  
For voters to claim like harms when they are re-allocated on account of party affiliation, 
however, poses a puzzle. Party affiliation is not just an attribute around which voters coalesce, like 
typical wedge issues; rather it is the very mechanism by which voters engage in the political 
process to advance their policy goals.43 A comparison to race is clarifying: racial minorities wish 
to avoid persecution, so (it is tacitly assumed) that they tend to form (or join) a party as a block.44 
Avoiding racial discrimination at the hands of elected representatives is the goal; a party affiliation 
is a means to advance that goal. Generally stated, a voter is harmed by deprivation of fair 
representation because that voter has less than equal capacity to advance or achieve her policy 
goals. However, party affiliation (and, transitively, the success of any particular party) is not an 
intrinsic goal.  
Thus, when a voter is moved from one district to another on account of party affiliation in 
a manner that makes that party affiliation less effective, it is peculiar to state that the nature of the 
harm is the inability of the voter to realize her partisan identity. Rather, the nature of the harm 
                                                 
42 In part because of the vividness of its facts, the classic expression of this may be Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 
339 (1960), though that case relied on the Fifteenth Amendment to invalidate the grossly discriminatory districting.  
43 The opinion in Shapiro, 2016 WL 4445320, dances around this question by observing that the First Amendment 
prohibits penalization on the basis of preferences, at 9, while failing to engage with the defendants’ response that 
“voting patterns are dynamic,” at 11. Voting patterns are dynamic precisely because they are a mechanism for 
realizing other preferences. 
44 But see Shaw, 509 U.S at 647 (requiring strict scrutiny for use of race in districting on the grounds that presuming 
minority voters think alike is an “impermissible racial stereotype[]”; Gerken, supra note 21, at 1727 (observing an 
underlying “essentialization” problem in treating all voters of the same race as having the same political preferences). 
For the conflict entailed in the attempt to reconcile these views with preventing racial gerrymandering, see generally 
Levinson, supra note 22 (antidilution requirement and strict scrutiny of race create a near-insoluble conflict in 
districting). 
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appears to be to undermine the organization by which the voter hopes to achieve her substantive 
political goals. If the voter is worse off, it is because she cannot expect the same level of efficacy 
from the coordinating institution she had previously relied upon to express her interests. 
C. The Adaptive Instrumentality of Party Identity 
Yet all is fair in love and war;45 and politics is war by other means.46 Unlike features such 
as race or religion, citizens might be reasonably expected to abandon their commitments to a party 
when it ceases to serve their ends – that is, when it is no longer beneficial for achieving their 
substantive political goals.47 A citizen might elect to do so because their once-chosen party has 
come to deviate from the substantive goals desired by the citizen, or because the party, despite still 
holding fast to the citizens’ values, is no longer able to effectively advance those values (including 
because it has suffered a partisan gerrymander).  
The judicial debate over partisan gerrymandering dances around but never confronts the 
relevant question: what is the ontology of commitment to a party?48 Without taking this into 
account, it is impossible to determine if partisan gerrymandering impairs “fair representation” 
under either a vote dilution or associational rights approach. The puzzle lies in partisan affiliation’s 
                                                 
45 This quote is widely attributed to JOHN LYLY, EUPHUES: THE ANATOMY OF WIT (1579).  
46 Cf. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 731 (trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1993). 
47 For one analysis this fluidity in historical practice, see FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER AND BRYAN D. JONES, AGENDAS 
AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 286 (2009) (describing how social and economic disruptions can result in 
shifts of standing commitments and subsequent realignment among both voters and parties). Underlying this theory 
of fluidity is an interest-based theory of politics that has a hoary tradition in American politics. See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT 18 (2009) (describing the role 
of interest in party politics). 
48 Some research has suggested that voters often treat partisan affiliation as a driver of preferences, rather than an 
expression of aggregated preferences. See, e.g., Richard Johnston, Party Identification: Unmoved Mover or Sum of 
Preferences, 9 ANNU. REV. POL. SCI. 329, 347 (2006) (arguing that “Party identification…is a mover but not entirely 
unmoved”, i.e., that party affiliation generally shapes ideology rather than the other way around). This conclusion 
indicates that partisan identity is highly “sticky,” suggesting strong P values in the model described in Section II.B.1 
infra.  But see HOWARD G. LAVINE ET. AL, THE AMBIVALENT PARTISAN 19 (2012) (working from the popular rational 
choice framework, “people are adaptive political decision makers who make strategic use of their cognitive resources”, 
and are more flexible than Johnston would suggest); Baumgartner and Jones, supra note 47, at 286 (describing how 
disruptions can result in realignment). However, the question for judicial intervention is, in a way, less about how 
voters behave, than if their behavior can comprise a basis for rights (or other-theorized) intervention by the Courts. 
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purpose. Party affiliation is ultimately instrumental – voters join parties in general, and select 
which parties to join in particular, in order to realize their first-order policy preferences:49 lowering 
taxes; protecting unions; preventing racial discrimination; criminalizing abortion; and so forth. It 
is these granular preferences that give voters a primary impetus for political involvement, and in 
terms of elections these preferences cannot be usefully dissolved or explained further. Because of 
its instrumentality in serving these foundational preferences, party affiliation can be characterized 
as a “second-order” political trait.  
When a party’s platform ceases to serve a voter’s interests (or again, more precisely, comes 
to serve a voter’s interest more poorly than the alternative), a voter has the choice to reject the 
party and support its rival.50 If party affiliation is only an instrumental mechanism for realizing a 
voter’s various specific policy investments, then such affiliation should be dynamic, as voters and 
parties engage in constant exchange to maximize electorate preference satisfaction and party 
chances of success.51 This principle is perhaps most famously captured in the median voter 
                                                 
49 See supra note 7. See also Michael S. Kang, The Hydraulics and Politics of Party Regulation, 91 IOWA L. REV. 131, 
133 (2005) (arguing parties should be treated as loose associations designed to advance the various private actors’ 
agendas). For a review of the history of the interest-coalition understanding of American politics, see JOHN GERRING, 
PARTY IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA  1828-1996, 27-29 (1998). Some recent normative political theorists have argued that 
partisan identity is more than instrumental. See, e.g., NANCY ROSENBLUM, ON THE SIDE OF THE ANGELS (2008); 
RUSSELL MUIRHEAD, THE PROMISE OF PARTY IN A POLARIZED AGE (2014); Lea Ypi, Political commitment and the 
value of partisanship, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 601 (2016). These assert that partisanship has social and normative 
dimensions that an instrumental treatment of party identity sidelines. See Muirhead at x (“partisanship is note a 
dispassionate ‘identification’…it is spirited, or prideful.”); Ypi at 603 (“partisanship matters…because certain 
associative practices are essential to sustaining and nurturing [political commitment]…A society without political 
commitment is a society of perpetually disengaged or permanently disaffected citizens”). 
50 This approach is of course dependent on the fact that the US is a first-past-the-post system, and thus the meaningful 
option available to voters when they dislike a party is to support the alternative (allowing American politics to 
generally be modelled on a one-dimensional space). See Campbell, supra note 7 at 164. See generally James A. 
Gardner, Madison’s Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Systems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 95 (2000) 
(describing the nature and implications of first-past-the-post systems). Schuck, supra note 12, at 1359 argues that first-
past-the-post voting undermines the “fair representation argument” offered against partisan gerrymandering, as first-
past-the-post will result in distortive over-representation for victorious parties. 
51 See, e.g., Michael Laver and Michel Schilperoord, Spatial models of political competition with endogenous political 
parties, 362 PHIL. TRANS. R. SOC. 1711, 1711 (2007) (characterizing the typical spatial model as presuming to have 
policy preferences and candidates as competing for elections by offering competing package preferences). 
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theorem, but the instrumentality of voter affiliation need not be conceived through any one specific 
theory.  
If voters can switch parties to serve their ultimate political ends – including abandoning a 
party which is no longer capable, given a particular configuration of voters due to district line 
drawing, of being securing victories – then partisan gerrymandering should pose no threat. Rather, 
after any particular line-drawing, voters and parties in a given district will engage in the mutual 
dynamic of compromising to determine what coalition of voter preferences and candidate 
platforms will be mutually most amenable to the majority of the electorate. If this reactive dynamic 
occurs after any particular line drawing, and party allegiance is purely an instrument by which 
voters realize their interests, with regards to partisanship, district line drawing is not a threat. The 
reactions of voters will ensure that any particular district selects the candidate who is most 
amenable to the majority of the voters.  
Thus, partisan gerrymandering is not prospectively problematic with regards to partisan 
affiliation (itself only of value to voters as a tool), but rather with regards to first-order preference 
satisfaction of particular groups. There is nothing preventing politicized line-drawing from 
targeting groups that have particular first-order preferences, and ‘cracking’ and ‘packing’ based 
on those preferences to dilute the votes of a particular block of voters. As described in detail infra, 
race can be understood as a particular important – and explicitly constitutionally protected –
interest. If the theory of partisanship as an instrumental vehicle for realization of substantive voter 
preference is accepted, partisan gerrymandering is not problematic because of its direct harm to 
parties, but because of its effective harm to popular realization of political preference. If this 
effective harm necessitates that courts prohibit districting based on party affiliation is the 
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underlying – but never clearly expressed debate52 – among the justices. It might be possible to 
adapt around partisan gerrymandering itself, but it is less clear that when party is a firm proxy for 
antagonistic groupings of preferences, manipulative line-drawing does not deeply harm realization 
of the electorate’s will. 
Even if partisan affiliation is wholly instrumental, there is value in parties as settled and 
reliable coordinating mechanisms, and changing their constituency and ideology imposes 
transaction costs. The parties, and the candidates who are their standard-bearers, must satisfy a 
vast array of internal constituencies, particularly in a two-party system. Through this, party identity 
obtains longitudinal significance as an ideological synthesis53 and as a hard-fought yet delicate 
product of negotiation and compromise.54 Rearranging the coalitions that make a party viable is 
not costless;55 and these transaction costs reveal another mechanism by which partisan 
gerrymandering can harm democracy.  
It is precisely partisan gerrymandering’s ability to materially impair electoral preferences 
that the Bandemer formula aspires to capture. However, the frustrating vagueness of the Bandemer 
formulation reveals the difficulties in using the existing rights framework to manage partisan 
gerrymandering.56 It is neither an immutable attribute like race, ethnicity, or gender, nor is it a 
                                                 
52 See Section III.B.3 infra.  
53 See note 47 supra (describing various theories that attach intrinsic normative value to partisan attachment).  
54 See Gilat Levy, A model of political parties, 115 J. ECON THEORY 250, 251 (2004) (parties are constructed by 
compromise between competing factions to discipline affiliated politicians). 
55 The presence of such costs is apparent in the debate over how voters process information. See, e.g., Thomas M. 
Carsey and Geoffrey C. Layman, Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in 
the American Electorate, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 464, 465 (2006). Voter ignorance would certainly complicate, and 
arguably exacerbate, these costs. See Christopher S. Elmendorf and David Schleicher, Districting for a Low-
Information Electorate, 121 YALE L. J. 1846, 1850-1854 (2012). 
56 Using rights to protect a fluid aspect of political identity may simply be a mismatch. In the context of protecting 
against majoritarian abuse, rights tend to be absolute and thus rigid in their political impact, rather than fluidity of 
votes. See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights and Votes, 121 YALE L. J. 1286, 1324 (2012). While Levinson analyses some of 
the tensions facing the use of rights to challenge racial gerrymandering, see id. at 1345, he does not address partisan 
gerrymandering, which raises the additional problems. See generally Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, 
concurring) (“political parties are the dominant groups” in the political process). 
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protected existential attribute like religious identity. Rather, it is an instrumental attribute deployed 
in the service of deeper political desires of participants in politics. There is thus an obtuseness to 
defending party identity as an independent right, because individuals’ interest in it is solely a 
function of other goods it can advance.  
More generally, the instrumentality and adaptiveness of party affiliation complicate any 
claim that partisan gerrymandering impairs fair representation. A voter who complains that he has 
a less powerful vote as a result of a partisan gerrymander does not directly claim that the 
representative process impairs his ability to realize first-order preferences, but rather claims that a 
central organizational mechanism by which he implements these first-order preferences is less 
effective. Voters have no right to be in a particular district, or be guaranteed the election of the 
candidate they favor.57 The right, rather, is to generally fair representation as non-discrimination; 
in the context of districting, this means a voter with the asserted characteristic of the claimant must 
have a less meaningful vote as a function of being a member of the group. Thus, a voter who claims 
that his right to fair representation is infringed by partisan districting must ultimately demonstrate 
both that his ability to realize his first-order political preferences is illegitimately impaired, and 
that this impairment flows from some factor that obstructs effective partisan reorganization.  
For partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, courts must successfully identify when 
allocating voters on the basis of parties harms their right to effective representation by preventing 
voters from using parties to advance first-order preferences. The remainder of the Article explores 
the challenges and contexts of this endeavor, and demonstrates that controlling the impact of 
                                                 
57 See Shapiro, 2016 WL 4445320, at 5 (“citizens have no constitutional right to reside in a district in which a majority 
of the population shares their political views and is likely to elect their preferred candidate.”). This is a corollary of 
the fact that a voter cannot claim vote dilution by function of the fact of merely happening to be in a district where 
she cannot elect her preferred candidate. See Gerken, supra note 21 at 1686 (observing the same claim in the racial 
vote dilution context). Cf. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131-32 (merely because a districting reduces the likelihood a given 
group will be able to elect its representative does not comprise a cognizable harm; and lack of proportional 
representation does not demonstrate a districting to be unfair). 
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partisan gerrymandering on the electorate’s realization of substantive political preference is far 
trickier than it might initially appear.  
II. POLITICIZED DISTRICTING AND THE SATISFACTION OF ELECTORAL PREFERENCE 
If partisan gerrymandering infringes voters’ rights, yet the purpose of party affiliation is to 
facilitate the satisfaction of voter policy preferences, partisan gerrymandering ought only to be 
identified as a wrong where it impairs such satisfaction. This Section begins with a simplified 
thought experiment that models how the implementation of an extreme partisan gerrymander 
might benefit, rather than harm, realization of the electorate’s preferences. This suggests that it 
cannot be politicized districting itself that is the actual evil at stake. The Section then proceeds to 
offer a more comprehensive model of how partisan gerrymandering can change voter preference.58  
A. Partisan Rearrangement and a Thought Experiment in Creative Destruction 
As this Section shows, partisan gerrymandering can benefit realization of the electorate’s 
will.59 If the actors in a polity adapt to redrawn district lines in a way that results in substantive 
voter preferences being satisfied within each district, then partisan gerrymandering may disrupt 
settled patterns of allegiance and conduct, thereby producing more preference-fulfilling 
governance. Partisan gerrymandering, in effect, might achieve “creative destruction”60 of inertial 
political affiliations, resulting in dynamic rearrangement of party platforms, thus better matching 
constituent policy preferences. 61 
                                                 
58 As discussed passim, this article relies on the spatial model, and debates around and updates to it, that have been 
prominent in American political science on voter and party behavior since the 1960s. 
59 For an argument that the type of gerrymander is relevant to the effect of gerrymandering, see Michael J. Kang, The 
Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J. L. P. P. 443 (2005). This article, however, rejects the 
distinction between offensive and defensive gerrymandering, because it distinguishes factors that would obstruct 
realization of political preference from any drawing of district lines. 
60 JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (1942). Others have used the phrase to 
describe shocks that shift partisan allegiance. Baumgartner and Jones, supra note 47, at 288. 
61 Unlike the type of exogenous shocks or disruptions to party allegiance caused by socio-economic change and 
identified in id.at 286, the types of shock caused by a partisan gerrymandering would relate to the constituencies of 
the parties themselves. It would thus be closer to a sort of shock that would induce deliberation on standing partisan 
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Purely random (ie, non-political) redistricting could also beneficially disrupt existing and 
potentially stagnant political relationships. However, by placing particular pressure on 
representatives and parties to satisfy their constituents regardless of original political allegiance, 
districting based on partisan affiliation might achieve this effect particularly robustly. Because 
partisan gerrymandering deliberately targets existing political relationships, its disruptive effects 
can induce change that is distinctly political, pressuring political parties to respond to voters’ 
desires in a remapped constituency.  
The mechanism of such transformation is preference-switching by representatives, parties, 
and constituents. Presuming that each of these categories of actors has clear goals – representatives 
to be (re)-elected, parties to maintain as much power as possible (presumably by maximizing the 
number of representatives), and constituents to have their political interests served as accurately 
as possible – partisan gerrymandering could induce them to rearrange their allegiances. It can break 
apart existing coalitions of interest by forcing representatives to change their views (and, in some 
conditions, their partisan allegiances), parties to change their collective platforms, and constituents 
what bundles of preferences they wish to be realized. The precise character of any such 
reconfiguration will depend on the levels of commitment to both particular issues and partisan 
loyalty by each entity, but the general principle is that each wishes to ensure that it is able to realize 
its goals whatever the arrangement of voters. 
A common useful principle for understanding such a realignment is the median voter 
theorem.62 In a two-party majoritarian democracy which determines victory by the highest vote-
                                                 
commitments described by Lavine, supra note 48, at 6-7 (drawing on empirical research to show that ambivalence 
towards partisan identity may produce fruitful political reflection) 
62 The classic statement of this theory is contained in Downs, supra note 7. See also Campbell et. al, supra note 7, at 
162. For a critical review of the academic perceptions of the median voter theorem, see generally Randall G. 
Holcombe, The median voter in public choice theory, 61 PUB. CHOICE 115 (1989); for an experimental test that further 
reviews the literature and provides an experiment that shows both the explanatory value and some of the limits of the 
median voter model, see, e.g., Eric J. Brunner and Stephen L. Ross, Is the median voter decisive? Evidence from 
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getter, those seeking election will seek to adopt a platform that peels away the voter that will tip 
the party over the threshold of victorious plurality. The result is that, all else equal, parties should 
dynamically rearrange their platforms as the electorate’s preferences change. Reality, of course, is 
more complicated – parties have long-run demographic allegiances and commitments that may 
inhibit seeking the ideal preference-satisfying platform for a given election, the charisma and 
appeal of individual representatives will vary election to election, and voters themselves have 
partisan loyalties that mean the ‘efficiency’ upon which the median voter theorem is premised will 
not be perfectly realized. Yet the prospective benefit of partisan gerrymandering is that it can upset 
some of these inertial political commitments. 
A highly simplified instance of a model of partisan gerrymandering and voter preference 
can illustrate how partisan gerrymandering can break up inertial politics.63 Imagine a state with 
three single-representative districts representing 99 total voters in the state, of whom 59 are 
Democrats (‘D) and 40 are Republican (‘R’). Posit that under districting arranged under ‘natural’, 
‘neutral’, or ‘fair’ principles,64 voting produced the fairly expected outcome of 2 Democratic seats 
and 1 Republican seat. Further – to simplify the issue of preferences – the parties have two issues 
at play, on which the parties initially diverge: Taxes (which can be either High or Low) and Gun 
rights (which can be either Pro or Anti). Each party has a position on these issues prior in the initial 
                                                 
referenda voting patterns, 94 J. Pub. Econ. 898 (2010); Kathleen Bawn et. al., A Theory of Political Parties: Groups, 
Policy Demands and Nominations in American Politics, 10 PERSP. ON. POL. 571, 576 (2012) (reviewing the theory of 
and assumptions underlying the median voter theorem.). 
63 The analysis in this Section makes a number of simplifying assumptions. However, by holding voter preferences 
constant and presuming that parties adapt by ‘competing’ for voters, it is possible to deploy fairly straightforward 
utility theory, see YOAV SHOHAM AND KEVIN LEYTON-BROWN, MULTIAGENT SYSTEMS 50-60 (2009) to add content 
and rigor to the intuition, expressed by. e.g., Kang supra note 58, that partisan gerrymandering may be beneficial. 
Note that in this analysis, voter preferences are held constant; securing the support of enough voters to secure 
political support, is the ‘payoff’ to parties from participating in the ‘game’. 
64 These neutral criteria are seminally laid out in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740. They include “making districts 
compact, respecting municipal boundaries, preserving the cores of prior districts, and avoiding contests between 
incumbent Representatives.” 
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setup – the Democratic party is Tax High (TH) and Gun Anti (GA) while Republican party is Tax 
Low (TL) and Gun Pro (Gp). Each voter has a position on these issues, but must prioritize one or 
the other ordinally – that is, a single voter may be any combination of High Tax or Low Tax and 
Gun Anti or Gun Pro, but will vote based on a single decisive issue. This produces 4 possible 
preference voters: [TH  | GA]; [TH  | Gp]; [TL  | Ga]; [TL  | Gp]. However, there are 8 possible voter 
preference arrangements, because a voter could weigh either issue more strongly. Thus, partisan 
affiliation and thus vote will be determined by the ordinally preferred issue.  
The following chart offers a possible numerical breakdown of how issues preferences 
might match partisan affiliation to reach the 59 D / 40 R breakdown: 
 Voter prefers TH Voter prefers TL 
Voter 
prefers Gp 
29 (prioritizes Tax  – votes ‘D’) 0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘R’) 
10 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘R’) 20 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘R’) 
Voter 
prefers Ga 
25 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘D’) 10 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘R’) 
5 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘D’) 0 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘D’) 
 
Critically, giving the greatest number of voters what they want would produce a Tax-High, 
Gun-Pro policy; 69 out of 99 voters prefer Tax-High to Tax-Low, and 59 out of 99 prefer Gun-Pro 
to Gun-Anti. However, in the starting setup, party platforms make it impossible for the majority of 
voters to be satisfied across both metrics, even as each party has a platform that satisfies a majority 
of its base.65 
                                                 
65 Such cross-cutting party allegiances can be explained by any number of phenomena, such as historical affiliations, 
accidents of past log-rolling between parties or constituent groups, or faded cultural associations. See generally Bawn 
et. al, supra note 62, at 573-575, 580 (offering both hypothetical and historical conceptions of how an ideology might 
serve to “unif[y] disparate policy demanders…into a national coalition” and enquiring how this might be applied to 
contemporary politics and a general model.).  
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Imagine the following allocation of voters in a pre-gerrymandered context (ie, districting 
that obeys purely ‘neutral’ principles): 
District 1: 
 
16 ‘D’, 17 ‘R’ = ‘R’ district 
District 2: 
 TH TL 
Gp 14 ( ‘D’) 0 (‘R’) 
0 ( ‘R’) 5 ( ‘R’) 
Ga 10 ( ‘D’) 3 ( ‘R’) 
0 ( ‘D’) 0 ( ‘D’) 
24 ‘D’, 8 ‘R’ = ‘D’ district 
District 3:  
 TH TL 
Gp 4 ( ‘D’) 0 (‘R’) 
5 ( ‘R’) 5 ( ‘R’) 
Ga 10 ( ‘D’) 5 ( ‘R’) 
5 ( ‘D’) 0 ( ‘D’) 
19 ‘D’, 15 ‘R’ = ‘D’ district 
 TH TL 
Gp 11 ( ‘D’) 0 (‘R’) 
5 ( ‘R’) 10 (‘R’) 
Ga 5 ( ‘D’) 2 (‘R’) 
0 ( ‘D’) 0 ( ‘D’) 
24   Partisan Gerrymandering and the Illusion of Unfairness  [22-Aug-17 
 
If by some electoral fluke, Republicans are able to gain control of the legislature and 
aggressively redistrict to favor Republicans and harm Democrats, they might draw new districts 
as follows: 
New District 1: 
 TH TL 
Gp 8 ( ‘D’) 0 (‘R’) 
10 ( ‘R’) 2 (‘R’) 
Ga 5 ( ‘D’) 5 (‘R’) 
3 ( ‘D’) 0 ( ‘D’) 
16 ‘D’, 17 ‘R’ = ‘R’ district 
New District 2: 
 TH TL 
Gp 18 ( ‘D’) 0 (‘R’) 
0 ( ‘R’) 5 (‘R’) 
Ga 10 ( ‘D’) 0 (‘R’) 
0 ( ‘D’) 0 ( ‘D’) 
28 ‘D’, 5 ‘R’ = ‘D’ district 
New District 3:  
 TH TL 
Gp 3 ( ‘D’) 0 (‘R’) 
0 ( ‘R’) 13 ( ‘R’) 
Ga 10 ( ‘D’) 5 ( ‘R’) 
2 ( ‘D’) 0 ( ‘D’) 
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15 ‘D’, 18 ‘R’ = ‘R’ district 
As a result of this aggressive ‘cracking’ and ‘packing’ of democratic voters (for example, 
the new districting has a much higher efficiency gap66), the Republicans control 2 out of 3 districts, 
despite only counting for approximately 40% of the electorate.  
On its face, this would appear to be a classically pathological partisan gerrymandering, 
discriminating against Democratic voters and diluting their votes. Yet, the Democratic party can 
seize back control of a seat by making a policy change: if the Democratic party (or, more precisely, 
its candidate in the relevant election) becomes Gun-Pro, New District 1 becomes Democratic, as 
10 Republican voters who are [TH  | Gp] but whom prioritize Gun policy should flip to the 
Democratic party. Moreover, as described above, this actually results in a set of policy outcomes 
that is better in terms of satisfying overall constituent preference: the now-dominant Democratic 
party is both Tax High and Gun Pro, as are the majority of voters. Some voters are made worse off 
– voters who prioritize Gun Anti now have no satisfactory party, and some Democratic voters ([TH  
| GA]) now are forced to accept only being satisfied on a single issue. Yet the polity as a whole is 
arguably better off in terms of preference satisfaction, precisely due to the disruptive adaptation 
caused by the partisan gerrymander.  
                                                 
66 The “efficiency gaps” for the districts are as follows: there are 99 statewide votes, of which 59 are D and 40 are R. 
Pre-gerrymandering, D has wasted (16 (lost in district 1) + 16 (surplus in district 2) + 4 (surplus in district 3)) = 36. R 
has wasted 15 (lost) + 8 (lost) + 1 (surplus)= 24. 36 - 24 = 12 difference in wasted votes. 12/99 = efficiency gap of 
12.1% (in D’s favor; this matches, as D has roughly 59% percent of voters but wins 67% (2 out of 3) of seats).  
Post-gerrymandering, the same calculations yield D wasted votes of 54, and R wasted votes of 9. 54 – 9 = 45 / 99 = 
45.5% (in favor of R, who have won 2/3rds of seats with only 40% of the electorate’s support). See Stephanopolous 
and McGhee, supra note 4, at 834, 852 (providing instructions for calculating efficiency gaps).  
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This model has an abstracting simplicity,67 though these assumptions serve, in at least some 
respects, to defend a certain conception of human autonomy.68 Yet it reveals how a partisan 
gerrymander, by disrupting existing allegiances to challenge settled political coalition, could 
produce stronger preference satisfaction across the polity. As described infra, where certain 
demographic trends adhere, this may produce pathological outcomes – but this will be a function 
of demography and political relationships, not merely of district line-drawing. The potential for 
beneficial reactions to partisan gerrymandering expresses a central component of the argument of 
those who reject the justiciability of challenges to the practice. A politically engaged, “civically 
                                                 
67 It presumes a highly simplified model of voter preference (in reality, most voters care about a far greater number of 
issues, care about each issue on a spectrum rather than a binary, and likely have policy preferences bundled together 
into unified ideologies) and behavior (in reality, voters may take active steps to shape party platforms, or react badly 
to what they see as changes in party platforms as ‘betrayals’; moreover parties are likely to value some ‘loyalist’ voters 
more highly and thus not want to upset them), presumes perfect political efficiency (a point in particular covered in 
Section III.B.2.a infra, regarding obstructions of partisan conduct; see also Bawn, supra note 62, at 578 (observing 
two poles on the question of if voters are, generally, ignorant or informed)), disregards the possible effects of 
representatives of differing levels of charisma or appeal, and ignores that party differentiation allows for agenda-
setting benefits (and thus that stronger party differentiation may be beneficial – the loss of any party that is Gun Anti 
arguably harms voter autonomy). See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1370 (describe local factors that can inflect election 
results); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND STEIN ROKKAN, CLEAVAGE STRUCTURES, PARTY SYSTEMS, AND VOTER 
ALIGNMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 1-5 (1967) (describing the role of structured party differentiation to enable 
meaningful political conflict). Some of these features are accounted for in the complex model in Section II.B.1 infra. 
Moreover, realistically the adaptation would not consist of a single ‘switch’ but rather fierce competition between 
parties to adaptively shuffle between positions (in the light of other influences, including the need to ingratiate with 
central wedge groups; see generally Bawn, supra note 62, at 591 (citing JACOB HACKER AND PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-
TAKE-ALL POLITICS 100-101 (2010) to observe that elections and thus party platforms are often dominated by wedge 
groups that achieve outsized status)) offer platforms most satisfying to guarantee optimal political outcomes. This 
reflects the fact that parties possess internal ideologies as institutions, which cannot be changed costlessly vis-à-vis 
the party as an entity. See note 47 supra for various perspectives on this position.  
68 See, e.g., ERIC BEERBOHM, IN OUR NAME: THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRACY (2012), at 26 (defending a deontological 
account of individual participation in democracy); ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 147 (2000) (freedom is a central 
precondition for democracy). For a terse description of the relationship between rights-based legal protections and 
personal autonomy, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Democracy and Distortion, 92 CORNELL L. REV.  601, 622 (2007). 
While too vast a field to broach or argument to fully address, it seems as though virtually no one in law – either among 
judges or academics – would ultimately reject individual freedom and the ability to express choice as a central pillar 
of democratic practice. It would undermine, for example, the significance of the competition theory advanced by 
scholars as described in Section III.B.2.a infra; the moral value of those who attack gerrymandering on First 
Amendment grounds; and the moral value of fair representation as a general principle. Cf., e.g., Gary King, 
Representation through Legislative Redistricting: A Stochastic Model, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 787, 798 (1989) 
(characterizing politics as “hardly deterministic”, but presuming that voter response to redistrict is basically 
mechanical).   
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militant electorate”69 will express its preferences robustly even as district lines are rearranged, if 
necessary by adapting preferences such that parties, in order to obtain the approval of a median 
voter, are induced to change their platforms. Indeed, this prospective adaptability of voters 
comprises one of the main challenges to successful partisan gerrymanders; even without 
intentional reactivity by political actors, natural demographic shifts and the thinness necessary to 
retain a disproportionate majority make securing a partisan gerrymander a logistical challenge.70 
Through their explicitly political character, partisan gerrymanders may catalyze parties’ and 
voters’ reaction to a shifting political landscape and modified voter preferences.  
The possibility of a gerrymander improving preference satisfaction, moreover, exposes the 
challenge of identifying how politicized districting infringes on voter rights. Since rational party 
and voter adaptation in response to the gerrymander could in some scenarios improve realization 
of democratic preference, it seems as though Democratic voters cannot allege they have been 
harmed by the gerrymander in a manner that is cognizable as a violation of a right. The 
gerrymander has neither diluted their votes on the basis of party (a rational response to the 
gerrymander improved the political satisfaction of some Democratic voters) nor meaningfully 
impaired their ability to associate as a party (indeed, their party organization would play a key in 
coordinating any rational adaptation). If the relevant actors fail to adapt by adjusting the party 
platform, this seems to be a deeper substantive failure of political rationality – a type of failing for 
which judicial intervention to quash the gerrymander would neither be sensible nor helpful. 
Likewise, while the voters who absolutely prioritize GA have been made worse off by the 
gerrymander, their inferior position is a function of real politics in response to the gerrymander, 
                                                 
69 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, 
dissenting)). 
70 See Cain, supra note 22, at 156 (describing the demographic-logistical challenges of successfully sustaining a 
gerrymander over time). 
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rather than any infringement of their right to political participation.71 Moreover, protecting the GA 
voters through political intervention appears pathologically anti-democratic: their position is 
simply the one the polity rejects, and there is neither constitutional mandate nor political logic72 
that makes their unpopular political preference deserving of judicial protection.  
Of course, not every arrangement of voters, or, given an arrangement of voters, outcome 
of a gerrymander, would actually benefit democratic preference.73 But the point of this thought 
experiment is to show that it is not gerrymandering based on partisan identity that inflicts a harm 
upon the electorate (in terms of preference satisfaction) nor can voters, as a result of a partisan 
gerrymander, necessarily claim their rights have been infringed. Rather, the effect of gerrymanders 
based on parties need to identified at a more granular level that unpacks the relevant preferences 
that parties represent. 
                                                 
71 The logical recourse for Anti-Gun voters is to advert to debate and popular discourse to support their view. See 
generally Shapiro, 2016 WL 4445320, at 17-18 (Bredar, D.J., dissenting) (partisan gerrymandering does not impair 
the ability to engage in political activism such as debate). 
72 See Ely, supra note 11, at 76-77. They are not a “discrete and insular” minority – they are just a group with a policy 
preference. 
73 Other arrangements of voter preference could, of course, result in a gerrymander that does disrupt realization of 
popular preference. An ‘R’ gerrymander with the following baseline polity – 
 
 Voter prefers TH Voter prefers TL 
Voter prefers 
Gp 
0 (prioritizes Tax  – votes ‘D’) 0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘R’) 
0 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘R’) 40 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘R’) 
Voter prefers 
Ga 
0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘D’) 0 (prioritizes Tax – votes ‘R’) 
59 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘D’) 0 (prioritizes Gun – votes ‘D’) 
 
– would simply result in grossly inferior voter preference, as two sets of policies, low taxes and pro-gun, are advanced, 
despite the alternatives being preferred by the vast majority of the polity. This, however, is due to substantive politics, 
and is a clear (if highly simplified) example of the ‘spoiler’ of preference bundling. See Section III infra. 
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B. Voter Preference and Political Adaptation 
The relationship between partisan gerrymandering, political adaptation, and preference 
satisfaction can be helpfully generalized. This enables a more comprehensive description of how 
actors might respond to politicized redrawing of district lines. 
1. The complex model 
Most voters care about a vast array of issues with different degrees of intensity,74 and likely 
have an affiliation from legacy, history, or instinct for a particular party.75 Thus the simple model 
used supra is primarily helpful as a thought experiment. A more76 accurate model of voter 
preference might be as follows:77  
𝑆 = 𝑃 + ∑ 𝐼1 ∗ 𝑉1 + 𝐼2 ∗ 𝑉2 + … 𝐼𝑛 ∗ 𝑉𝑛  
S stands for a party’s ‘score,’ P represents the voter’s partisan loyalty,78 I represents the intensity 
of a preference, and V represents a preference vis-à-vis a given party’s position on the relevant 
                                                 
74 This is the basis of the spatial model described in the notes to Section I.C supra. 
75 See note 47 supra. 
76 This model still does not fully accommodate complexities related to voting over time, and the vagaries of fortune. 
For one, it does not accommodate the various tactics and impulses that may figure into voter decision-making. See 
PAUL M. SNIDERMAN AND EDWARD H. STIGLITZ, THE REPUTATIONAL PREMIUM, A THEORY OF PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION AND POLICY REASONING 13-14 (2012) (reviewing the literature on how voter tendencies can inflect 
party and preference voting); see also Schuck, supra note 12, at 1370 (“A party’s fortunes wax and wane over time. 
In a single election, its success will vary according to the office in question, the attractiveness of particular candidates, 
coattail effects, salient issues, voter turnout, and many other factors.”). For a broader account of how representation 
goes beyond “policy congruence,” see GARY C. JACOBSON AND JAMIE L. CARSON, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL 
ELECTIONS 243 (2016). These factors likewise affect voter preference in a given election. Many of these effects can 
be understood as reflected in P, and subsequently that one variable may be treated as over-explanatory.  
77 As with much of the rest of the reasoning in this Article, this model is adapted from the spatial model – that voters 
make a decision regarding which party to support by aggregating preferences. The notation adopted here reflects the 
idea that each voter is selecting a party based ultimately on a utility function. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory 
for Political Scientists, at 23 (1994) (describing how utility functions can predict actions). For related, more 
mathematically sophisticated models of voter behavior as preference aggregation, but one that is more difficult to use 
to unpack the partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence, see Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson, Electoral Poaching 
and Party Identification, 20 J. THEORETICAL POL. 275 (2008); Levy, supra note 54, at 255 (offering a model of voter 
behavior as preference aggregation). 
78 See generally Alan Gerber and Donald P. Green, Rational Learning and Partisan Attitudes, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 794, 
797-98 (1998) (summarizing a view on how partisan identity is formed and updated); Sniderman and Stiglitz, supra 
note 76. However, as described passim, in order to maintain manageable simplicity in the model, this formula treats 
P as a variable of significant versatility: it includes long-term strategic thinking related to party success or an ideology, 
as well as ‘sentiments’ in political affiliation beyond tactical affiliation. 
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issue. The preference for a particular party can be calculated using the same equation but replacing 
each 𝑉𝑥 with a value that incorporates the difference between a voter’s ‘ideal’ position and the 
party’s actual position. A voter, in effect, has a higher value for each issue vis-à-vis a particular 
party where the differential is smaller, and prefers the party with the higher aggregate score 
calculated by summing up the 𝑉𝑥 ∗ 𝐼𝑥 values. A ‘swing’ voter is one who has ‘scores’ for the parties 
that are similar, and thus will be highly sensitive to slight shifts in party or candidate platform or 
attributes that might inflect partisan loyalty.  
A party’s goal is to adopt a set of positions defined by the set [𝑉1,2…𝑛] such that the majority 
of voters have a higher S for that party than for any available alternatives in as many districts as 
possible.79 With perfect information and in the absence of a P, this would be trivial: a party would 
just offer positions that maximize scores for a majority of voters across a maximum possible 
number of districts. However, uncertainty regarding both binary voter preferences on any given 
policy (uncertainty regarding the best V positions) and weighting of voter preferences (uncertainty 
regarding I values) clouds this analysis. Moreover, P value creates an obstacle to change, as voters 
will usually require a certain threshold of greater preference satisfaction to defect from a party 
towards which they have loyalty; and existing voters may reduce their own value of P towards 
their current party if they see a party as betraying its principles by shifting values. As is described 
in more detail below, the weight of P is critical in determining the effects of a partisan gerrymander 
because it can induce current voters and current parties to maintain status quo allegiances. 
                                                 
79 P thus contains an element that this article leaves to the side: institutional pressures upon party formation. While 
this article treats parties (and candidates) as ruthlessly victory-maximizing market actors, parties have internal 
ideologically driven agendas, which can be caused by structural factors. See Bawn, supra note 62, at 781.  
[22-Aug-17   Partisan Gerrymandering and the Illusion of Unfairness   31 
 
This model aims to capture some of the complexity involved in reacting to a partisan 
gerrymander by both parties and voters.80 The risks and trade-offs of such adaptation can take two 
broad forms. Firstly, any change will impose transaction costs in terms of P. For voters, this takes 
the form of having to abandon existing allegiances in order to switch to a party that may now offer 
better policy satisfaction. For parties, this involves potentially alienating existing voters (thus 
reducing their P values) in the process of changing positions to attract new voters; existing voters 
may identify this as a betrayal of any claim to ideological consistency held by the party.81 
Secondly, any change will likely involve compromises on other issues.82 A voter who switches to 
a new party will likely have to take on some new, less desirable 𝑉𝑥 that were provided by the old 
party, even if the new party offers a greater overall satisfaction; this comprises a challenge in the 
absence of perfect clarity regarding preference weighting. Likewise, parties that adjust policies to 
attract new voters need to balance the prospective alienation of existing voters who preferred the 
old position. 
2. The effects of partisan gerrymandering  
While even the complex model simplifies the relationship between parties and voters, it is 
capable of illustrating the prospective benefit of partisan gerrymandering. If it is presumed that a 
successful democracy maximizes substantive voter policy preferences, partisan gerrymandering 
                                                 
80 For the simplicity of the model, this treatment collapses candidate platforms into party platforms. If the views of 
those such as Johnston, supra note 48 (voters largely align with parties) or Bawn, supra note 62, at 571 (parties form 
dominant coalitions and thus select and discipline candidates) are accepted, then this differential may be slight in any 
case. Moreover, if parties are only a weakly coordinating mechanism, it is unclear why partisan gerrymandering should 
matter in any case; candidates would simply obey the median voter theorem for a given district. 
81 See generally Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties, and 
the Vote, 73 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1071, 1083 (“Surely, citizens are well advised to view the parties to some extent as 
governing teams, with records of past performance which bears upon future prospects.”). In this regards betrayal of a 
previously advanced position would suggest a lack of consistency by a party. Cf. Johnston, supra note 48, at 331 
(suggesting loyalty is a pre-formed driver, and thus that voters will adjust their views rather than shift partisan loyalty); 
and Kovenock and Roberson, supra note 77, at 276 (treating loyalty as a preference that can be built into 
understandings of voter preference). 
82 This model, by separating out P, differentiates from the model offered in id., by suggesting that partisan loyalty is 
not merely another policy preference, but rather a special characteristic.  
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can facilitate this by re-allocating voters in a manner that challenges their existing solidified 
preference bundles (organized by parties). When voters are no longer able to elect their prior 
preferred candidates, they may be induced to re-order their preferences in order to retain political 
relevance. Likewise, candidates (or the parties who select and support them) who have been 
gerrymandered out of a seat may be induced to rearrange their platforms to appeal to the new set 
of constituents.  
The rational response of both sets of harmed political actors is adaptation.83 Rational voters 
would recognize that continued commitment to the existing party platform – and perhaps the 
existing party – will result in the voters’ continued irrelevance, and their inability to shape policy 
outcomes. Even if the current party offers an optimal platform for some subset of current party 
voters, continued commitment to the existing party platform would result in electoral defeat. 
Voters should thus engage in re-bundling of the preferences,84 and assessing which preferences 
they would be willing to sacrifice, and which they would wish to retain, in order to potentially 
support a victorious candidate through allegiances with voters from the victorious party (either by 
compromising their own harmed party’s platform to attract marginal victorious voters, or by 
switching to the victorious party in exchange for the prospective opportunity to influence its 
platform). In effect, defeated voters should abandon their current partisan configuration, determine 
the compromises they are willing to make, and then behave in a rational if mercenary fashion. The 
party harmed by gerrymandering, meanwhile, would need to engage in a corollary process, of 
                                                 
83 How frequently voters actually behave in such a manner varies. See Carsey and Layman, supra note 55, at 474  
(observing that voters, facing a diverge from their party on an issue, will vary between switching party and switching 
issue); cf. Johnston, supra note 48 (suggesting partisanship is the primary mover). 
84 See Samuel DeCanio, Democracy, the Market, and the Logic of Social Choice, 58 AM. J. POL. SCI. 637, 643 (2014) 
(observing that, in reality, parties offer multi-faceted “bundles” of goods and there is imperfect expression of 
preference in voting, as voters can only cast a single ballot). 
[22-Aug-17   Partisan Gerrymandering and the Illusion of Unfairness   33 
 
revising its platform to satisfy more voters.85 This would involve changing the platform such that 
a different array of voters – reflecting the new composition of the post-gerrymandered constituency 
in each district – would be satisfied.  
In an environment without transaction costs for these re-arrangements, each given 
constituency would simply re-adapt to select an optimized candidate, and each party would offer 
a candidate that sought the precise median voter in each given district. However, there are 
transaction costs to these transitions. In the complex formula, much of this transaction cost is 
expressed by the partisan preference value P, which can prevent voters from rationally switching 
parties and parties from ruthlessly adopting the most preference-satisfying platforms.86 The 
corollary cost for parties involve the challenge of coordinating across a multi-district party as well. 
A change in platform would likely displease current party members satisfied with the party’s 
current policies, and further potentially unsettle coherence of the party coalitions and ideology. 
However, such reform of platforms could strip away marginal voters from the victorious party, 
thereby returning the harmed party to political competitiveness (particularly since ‘cracked’ 
districts usually rely upon particularly thin margins).87 Thus, a reasonable voter from a party 
harmed by a gerrymander would accept some harm to its internal platform preference satisfaction, 
if that were the price of the voter’s preferred party regaining power – unless, of course, the other 
party’s platform became more attractive, in which case the voter should, logically, switch party 
allegiance.  
                                                 
85 The reciprocal nature of voter and party adaptation is captured in Michael Laver and Michel Schilperoord, supra 
note 51. Voters want preferences satisfied (but they will only be satisfied if they select a winning candidate); 
candidates and parties want to win (but will only win if they can successfully poach voters). 
86 See Gerber and Green, supra note 78, at 795 (offering, among competing views of formation of party loyalty, one 
that treats it as “ballast” that “stabiliz[es] party competition amid shifting political currents.”). 
87 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 153 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Schuck, supra note 12, at 1341-43; Cain, supra note 22, at 
156. 
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Such adaptation returns vibrant competition and equilibrium of preference satisfaction to 
gerrymandered districts, at the cost of the platform configuration, and perhaps ideological 
integrity, of parties.88 As the first move of such an adjustment, political actors from the harmed 
parties must sacrifice the commitment to partisan identity P in order to shift towards a set of policy 
positions that can attract voters from the party that implemented the gerrymander. For voters, this 
damage to P may involve either a willingness to embrace the dominant, gerrymandering party (in 
exchange for the dominant party itself shifting its position to accommodate some preferences from 
the crossover voter), but at the cost of the voter surrendering previous partisan identity; or a 
willingness to accept changes to the party platform of the harmed party to try to strip away 
marginal voters from the gerrymandering party.89 For parties, this may take the form of disrupting 
established party dogma (that is, a certain set of 𝑉𝑥 positions and the coherent sense of partisan 
identity P) to attract crossover voters from the party that implemented the gerrymander.  
This violence to settled partisan identity may seem to be the harm of partisan 
gerrymandering; but as the simple model above shows, by disrupting set and potentially inertial 
partisan allegiances, the result can be to improve overall preference satisfaction.90 Partisan 
commitment P can keep voters attached to outmoded party platforms, and obstruct the attempt to 
maximize voter preference satisfaction. Partisan gerrymandering, by discouraging inertial 
                                                 
88 One longitudinal effect this model does not address is the possibility that individual political actors might deem it 
desirable to accept short-term political losses in order to retain long-term control of an internal party agenda, or 
avoid specific compromises. See generally NICOLE MELLOW AND JEFFREY K. TULIS, LEGACIES OF LOSING IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS (University of Chicago Press, forthcoming 2017). Cf. Robert Post and Reva Siegal, Roe Rage: 
Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373, 390 (2007) (describing such a 
phenomenon in the context of political reaction to legal decisions). 
89 See Kovenock and Roberson, supra note 77, at 288-291 (describing a model of when parties will try to ‘poach’ 
opposing voters).  
90 See id. at 297 (“voters pay a price for partisan loyalty.”). The “creative destruction” of partisan gerrymandering can 
induce voters to reconsider this price. 
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attachment to party identity, can induce parties and voters to reject partisan attachments in favor 
of remaining competitive by adjusting preferences and party platforms. 
C. Rights and Justiciability in the Shadow of Political Adaptation 
Does the process of adaptation in response to partisan gerrymandering itself suggest any 
justiciable constitutional wrong? Some partisan gerrymanders might arrange voters in a manner 
that is substantively resistant to circumvention through adaptation due to the preferences of voters, 
a type of pathology discussed in Section III infra. However, in the absence of such ‘spoiler’ 
conditions, the omission by political actors to react to redrawn district lines seems to be a 
substantive political decision (or failing), and thus, as described more extensively in Section IV, 
an odd choice for judicial protection.91 If the conclusion is that voters and parties cannot manage 
their responses to changing political circumstances, the courts would effectively be intervening to 
protect mainstream actors from their own political incompetence. 
The question then becomes if rational adaptation (whether adaptive, or deliberately non-
adaptive) to partisan gerrymandering could comprise the basis for a justiciable constitutional 
wrong. This again requires an enquiry into the nature of party constitution and affiliation. If parties 
were purely coordination mechanisms that were ‘refreshed’ from scratch at every election, then 
districting, vis-à-vis such neutral and content-free coordination mechanism, would inflict no harm 
upon voters.92 However, parties, and voter partisan commitments, are not entirely mercenary 
marketplaces – they also reflect organic institutional development and persistent ideological 
commitments shared by multiple citizens and various blocks. Partisan gerrymandering interferes 
with these qualities of parties, either by inducing external change, or by reducing the efficacy of 
                                                 
91 See Schuck, supra note 12, at 1379 (observing that regulating partisan gerrymandering would comprise direct 
“regulation of politics”). See also Section IV infra. 
92 The dilution, in effect, would not cause the harm of vote dilution – reducing a party’s political power. See Gerken, 
supra note 21.  
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parties that, even in response to changed constituencies, do not deviate from their ‘naturally’ 
evolved party programs.  
Any reasonable treatment would deny such a generic judicial obligation to protect the 
‘natural’ condition or evolution of party identity. Firstly, such an intervention would require entry 
into a substantive morass of the nature of party identity, and its longitudinal development. This is 
both technically beyond the ken of courts and an inappropriately substantive political question, as 
it requires a judicial view regarding the correct ‘baseline’ theory of the institutional evolution of 
parties.93 Secondly, such an intervention would use the courts to determine attributes of politics 
appropriately left to the exercise of democratic autonomy.94 The management and content of a 
party’s platform is unequivocally the responsibility of party members themselves; in order to 
identify a general constitutional right infringed by modifications to this platform, the Court would 
need to conclude that the judiciary plays an appropriate role in shaping party platforms. This is not 
only perhaps judicially unmanageable, but prospectively undemocratic. Rather than protecting a 
party equally under the law or protecting a right to association, such judicial intervention in party 
formation would disrupt democratic autonomy.95 While the next section enquires if particular 
                                                 
93 Cf. Einer Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review? 101 YALE L. J. 31, 48 
(observing that critiques of interest group pluralism require a “baseline” of acceptable influence). Elhauge’s article 
questions the concern with interest group pluralism expressed in, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American 
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985) (that interest group capture of government functions poses a significant 
threat), and argues that any challenge to interest group pluralism faces a ‘baselining’ problem. One could observe that 
partisan gerrymandering is, at a high level of abstraction, a similar problem – the process of districting is ‘captured’ 
by the dominant party. Determining, however, the right baseline of districting – in effect determining how much 
political influence “is too much?”). Vieth, 541 U.S. at 297. 
94 This can be seen as the synthesis of two concepts. The first is that that political outcomes should be left to democratic 
process. See Ely, supra note 11, at 103 (observing that judicial intervention is justified only when processes fail, 
otherwise the substance of democratic politics should be left to democracy); see also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 14 (2000) (arguing that even determining the bounds of constitutionalism 
should be a matter of political debate). The second is the idea that parties are powerful, and, this article argues, adaptive 
players in political life. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (parties are dominant players in 
politics who can engage in self-care).  
95 Hints of this idea are emerge from the Bandemer concurrences: Chief Justice Burger’s sense that the Constitution 
dictates “responsibility for correction of such flaws [as partisan gerrymandering lies] in the people,” 478 U.S. at 144; 
and Justice O’Connor’s suggestion that parties can “fend[] for themselves through the political process”, id. at 153. 
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exogenous circumstances can impair partisan gerrymandering, it seems impossible to identify a 
general right to be protected from partisan gerrymandering, insofar as the practice is merely 
another factor in the continuous adaptation that political actors must undertake. 
III. THE ‘SPOILERS’ OF PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING 
Where political actors are inhibited from responding to a politicized redistricting by 
compromise and adaptation, partisan gerrymandering can inflict significant damage upon the 
effective realization of popular preferences. These circumstances provide the strongest (though 
still dubious) case for judicial intervention. This section unpacks the two such categories: the 
robustness of a comprehensive partisan identity, and substantive voter preference arrangements 
that naturally break voters into mutually hostile blocks.96 The section then observes that the 
conflict over partisan gerrymandering within the Supreme Court (and in the literature) revolves 
around these ‘spoiler’ conditions, but the lack of a clear analytical framework has obscured the 
debate.  
A. Excessive Partisanship and Bundled Preferences 
Two types of conditions can result in partisan gerrymandering harming realization of the 
electorate’s preferences: excessive partisan attachment; and strongly correlated bunching of 
preferences. These circumstances can divide determinative blocks of voters into inimical and 
                                                 
This article adds force to their arguments by arguing that the very nature of party formation in light of constituent 
autonomy supports this analysis. 
96 For a discussion of how the spoiler conditions have evolved, and how they intersect in complex ways (particularly 
in race-party interaction), see generally Bruce Cain and Emily R. Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and 
Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L. J. 867 (2016). For an analysis and review of the question (ultimately concluding in the 
negative) that partisan gerrymandering exacerbates polarization (which can be traced to either of the spoiler conditions 
discussed herein), see Nolan McCarty et. al., Does Partisan Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 666, 678 (2009).  
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irreconcilable factions.97 The modelling described above illustrates how each of these can render 
partisan gerrymandering harmful. 
1. Strong partisan attachment 
If enough voters have sufficiently strong attachments to party identity, effective responses 
to politicized districting will become prohibitive, and partisan gerrymandering can impair effective 
preference expression.98 Indeed, the prospective benefits of partisan gerrymandering come from 
its ability to induce beneficial reorganization of party positions, such that both parties ‘compete’ 
more vigorously for marginal voters. But if the critical mass of prospective crossover voters has 
such strong partisan affiliation that it would require profoundly dramatic changes in the 
gerrymandered party’s platform to get them to ‘defect’, then the gerrymandered party will be 
whipsawed. To tempt crossover voters, the gerrymandered party would have to change its platform 
so dramatically that it might disrupt continuity and coherence in party identity, thereby alienating 
its current constituency.99 
                                                 
97 Anxiety over faction has a long history in American political thought. See generally Madison, supra note 47. For 
descriptions of the various structural mechanisms by which Framers attempted to manage faction, see ROBERT A. 
DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 15-27 (1956); Gardner, supra note 50, at 152. 
98 As described infra, the most common complaint from academics – that partisan gerrymandering serves not to 
advantage one party, but to impair competition in a way that entrenches incumbents – can be understood as a form of 
partisan attachment. That is, particular incumbents are able to establish a stable base of voters who will, for loyalty-
related reasons, not oust them. While there might be other mechanisms by which existing candidates entrench 
themselves (such as use of shadow primaries, elite selection mechanisms, and so forth), these are intrinsically unrelated 
to districting, and ought to be managed through separate political reforms or judicial intervention. If partisan 
gerrymandering is meaningful, it is because general voter approval is still essential to politicians’ success, not because 
political elites have deprived the electorate of power. Thus insofar as partisan gerrymandering can itself benefit 
incumbents, it must be because there is some preference among the electorate of a district for their existing incumbent. 
This article categorizes this as a form of partisan loyalty. If incumbents are able to exploit such partisan loyalty to 
impair competition, this is a deficiency of substantive voter political competence, not a trait that can be attributed to 
district line shape. 
99 Some would argue that the very fact that partisan gerrymandering comprises an exogenous shock to partisan identity, 
and force its disruption, might be toxic in and of itself. See, e.g., Ypi, supra note 49, at 605 (characterizing partisan 
commitments as an associative commitment like friendship; exogenous transformations like partisan gerrymandering 
might be seen as impairing the virtue of such associations); cf. Lavine et. al., supra note 48 (suggesting that putting 
partisan preferences under stress might induce beneficial self-reflection). 
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The complex model would identify this as P being so strong such that the gerrymandered 
party would be forced to adjust a prohibitive number of  𝑉𝑥 preferences to achieve a superior S for 
a sufficient number of crossover voters, particularly if such changes would harm the P of its 
existing constituency and enable the opposing party to attract them through comparatively minor 
𝑉𝑥 changes. In effect, by forcing the harmed party to transform its constitutive ideology (and thus 
perhaps lose its original base), partisan gerrymandering places a party that has suffered a 
gerrymander in an untenable position. If P value of the voters from the beneficiary party who must 
be induced to crossover is strong enough, these first-mover costs will prevent (ex ante) or punish 
(ex post) efficient adjustment. 
Indeed, if P is strong enough, no degree of  𝑉𝑥 adjustment will tempt enough crossover 
voters, and the partisan gerrymander will simply prevent realization of majoritarian voter 
preference – the type of harm to individual rights and the democratic system that seems to be the 
classical concern of partisan gerrymandering. This can be demonstrated in a trivial manner by 
adding partisan loyalty to the Simple Model from Section II.A supra. If P is strong enough such 
that [TH  | Gp] R voters will not abandon their R affiliation for the added preference satisfaction of 
going from Tax-Low to Tax-High, no adjustment to the D platform is available to correct the 
effects of the partisan gerrymander, and the effect of the partisan gerrymandering is merely to 
result in a minority achieving control over Tax policy.  
2. Correlated preference bundling 
Adaptation to gerrymandering will also be impaired where most voters’ differing 
substantive preferences are highly correlated, and geography (and other limitations) allow such 
correlation to be exploited in districting.100 If voters’ preference bundles are such that a party can 
                                                 
100 This possibility is known to the courts. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 359 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“in recent political 
memory, Democrats have often been concentrated in cities while Republicans have often been concentrated in suburbs 
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satisfy most issues for one large block of voters, or most issues for another, there will be few 
prospective crossover voters to which an adapting party can appeal by making marginal 
modifications to its platform. Likewise, voters who wish to defect will struggle to extract 
concessions from the rival party, because the rival party will have strong incentives to remain 
steadfast to its current constituents. 
Returning to the simple model from Section II.A.1 supra allows for a simple 
demonstration. If all D voters are [TH  | GA] and all R voters are [TL  | Gp], then the groups will 
naturally form antagonistic blocks, with parties presumably corresponding to each view, and 
perhaps serving as foundations for concretizing the blocks as distinct ideologies. The negotiation 
between parties and voters and rearrangement of platforms that partisan gerrymandering can 
inspire will not occur. In such a situation partisan gerrymandering results in unfair outcomes, as 
the preferences of the majority will not be recognized. The potential for ‘creative destruction’ that 
can redeem partisan gerrymandering is lost. 
Voter preferences are unlikely, in reality, to fall into such cleanly antagonistic blocks,101 
but the greater the number of preferences that are bundled together, the more difficult it becomes 
for parties to make marginal adjustments to platforms to poach marginal voters. Any such bundled 
position that appeals to prospective crossover voters will displease existing party members; and in 
                                                 
and sometimes rural areas”); Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229, at 11. Some have argued that such geographic clustering 
should be used to guide the districting jurisprudence. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Redistricting and the 
Territorial Community, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1379 (2012); see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 
Harv. L. Rev. 1903 (2012) (arguing that high diversity in districts may actually be problematic). Such geographic 
clustering, however, is parasitic upon preference bundling; what geographic clustering does is make it easier for a 
gerrymandering entity to exploit bundled preferences in districting, and thereby obstruct geographical adaptation. 
101 See DeCanio, supra note 84, at 643 (observing that the mismatch between the number of policies parties must 
accommodate and the fact that voters can only cast a single ballot will result in a degree of mistmatch). 
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order to convert prospective crossover voters, a party would have to change enough positions so 
as to completely alienate existing party members.102 
As discussed more extensively in Section IV infra, preference bundling is a danger to a 
unified electorate and civic politics more generally, as a polity with such cleavages may lack civic 
unity and suffer the problems of faction. Moreover, it is likely to creating a feedback loop: strong, 
correlated preference differences will likely increase partisan loyalty, further dividing an electorate 
by partisan identity.  
3. The historically weightiest spoiler: race in America  
The character of spoiler conditions is further illuminated by comparison to a practice so 
destructive that it has generated its own tangled jurisprudence: racial districting. At its most 
disruptive, race can assume overriding weight, a 𝑉𝑥 that for a determinative set of voters has an 𝐼𝑥 
value that dominates other considerations, thereby arranging voters into implacably opposed 
factions. 
American history reveals that the such strong racial animus can strongly shape voters’ 
political identities, resulting in strong and lasting P values. The Solid South was solid because race 
shaped Southern political dynamics, and the 𝑉𝑥 of the racial wedge became intertwined with the P 
of the Democratic party.103 As partisan positions evolved, the Republicans were able to realign as 
                                                 
102 Some would argue this occurs under particular circumstances. See, e.g., Baumgartner, supra note 47 (describing a 
theory of realignment built around moments of deep realignment). One way of conceiving of this is more generally is 
damage to a party’s “brand.” See generally Sigge Winther Nielsen and Martin Vinaes Larsen, Party brands and voting, 
33 ELEC. STUD. 153 (2014) (observing that partying branding influences voter behavior). 
103 The seminal account of this is contained is magisterially described IN V. O. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE 
AND NATION (1949). Others have offered various updates of this account, particularly in light of the inversion of the 
Solid South from Democratic to Republican. See, e.g., BYRON E. SHAFER AND RICHARD JOHNSTON, THE END OF 
SOUTHERN EXCEPTIONALISM: CLASS, RACE, AND PARTISAN CHANGE IN THE POSTWAR SOUTH 51-53 (2009) (outlining 
a theory of how black politics and in particular black enfranchisement through legal chance in the 1960s requires a 
revision of Key’s account); M. V. HOOD III ET. AL, THE RATIONAL SOUTHERNER 64-67 (2012) (making a similar 
argument). For an account that focuses on how racial animus affected legal change, see, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Race 
or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and 
Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58, 58-60 (2014). 
42   Partisan Gerrymandering and the Illusion of Unfairness  [22-Aug-17 
 
the party of the South – but the momentousness of the shift merely reinforces that P will often be 
particularly intense where it can be traced to an overriding  𝑉𝑥 based in an immutable and divisive 
feature. 
Where an electorate’s dominant preferences are so dictated by a single wedge issue, party 
identity will resist negotiation or compromise. In such circumstances, a competently executed 
partisan gerrymander will irrevocably harm members of the defeated party through classic 
discriminatory districting tactics.104 Where such a wedge issue dominates and partisan identity 
subsequently assumes an at least temporary fixedness, the perspective of the liberal wing of the 
Court (discussed in Section III.B.i.2 infra) seems vindicated.105  
Of course, partisan gerrymandering becomes a weapon in vicious wedge-group battle only 
where toxic political circumstances exist. District line-drawing that discriminates against a 
vulnerable group is parasitic upon the invidious firmness and ardency of the dominant block. Were 
their views not so firm and their political allegiances not so unitary, there would be opportunities 
for adaptation that would alleviate the partisan districting. This, in turn, supports, the view that 
drawing of districts itself is not the problem, but rather the substantive views of the electorate, and 
their predilection to be antagonistic, tribal, and inflexible.106  
                                                 
104 Gomillion remains the classic example of such an exercise in racial vote dilution; see generally Gerken, supra note 
21. Under US federal law, of course, where such a gerrymander tracks race it will also effect racial vote dilution, 
prohibited under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and would be unequivocally illegal. However, the current Court 
may be eroding the efficacy of such mechanisms. Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612 (2013), for example, 
eliminated the precoverage formula of Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act. See Cain and Zhang, supra note 96, at 884 
(observing that partisan gerrymandering can impair the voting power of racial minorities, and that the ability of Section 
2 of the VRA to prevent such racial effects is unclear); Hasen, supra note 2. For an argument that voter protection 
should shift to concern with partisan distortion of the voting process more generally, see Samuel Issacharoff, Ballot 
Bedlam, 64 DUKE L. J. 1363 (2015). 
105 The most extreme approach to this is Justice Souter’s dissent in Vieth with regards to any group that would be the 
loser in such a wedge-group battle. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 347 (arguing that any ‘vigorous hostility’ by a major party 
against a ‘different but politically coherent group’ – including another major party – should be suspect). 
106 This sense may be reinforced by the fact that relatively oblique “exercise[s] in geometry” are only one of the tools 
used to deprive minority voters of the franchise, as part of a general attack on their political power. See Shaw, 509 
U.S. at 639-40 (classifying racial gerrymanders as one such tool, along with others such as literacy tests and 
grandfather clauses); Levinson and Sachs, supra note 2, at 414 (observing the use of electoral entrenchment tools by 
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B. The Inchoate Struggle over Spoilers in the Supreme Court and the Literature 
This analysis of ‘spoiler’ conditions reveals that any harm inflicted by politicized 
districting derives from underlying substantive political preferences that make typical adaptation 
ineffective. Thus, condemnation of partisan gerrymandering should point to the effects of spoiler 
conditions. This Section demonstrates that, while the courts and literature have not framed the 
analysis as such, spoiler conditions inevitably emerges as a central feature of the analysis. 
1. The Court’s treatment of spoilers  
The arguments offered by the conservatives and liberals in the leading gerrymandering 
cases both take as an unspoken foundational question whether partisan identity has characteristics 
that allow for competitive adaptation in response to politicized districting. Each side implicitly 
treats partisan identity either as a fluid characteristic that cannot act as a definitive spoiler (the 
conservative view), or, through analogizing to race, as a firm attribute that can impair fair 
representation if used as the basis for redistricting, thus facilitating rights-based protection of voter 
party affiliation (the liberal view).  
                                                 
the Democratic party in the post-Reconstruction South to minimize the power of black voters). Cf. Hasen, supra note 
103, at 71-75 (arguing the Court should emphasize voter protection in general, instead of using abstruse analysis to 
determine if a given act of determination is driven by race or by party). 
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a. The conservative treatment of spoilers  
The conservative107 jurisprudence emphasizes the reciprocal abilities of voters to switch 
parties in light of a redistricting,108 and of parties to fend for themselves in the political thicket.109 
These paired opportunities lead conservatives to conclude that partisan gerrymandering is unlikely 
to inflict constitutional harm.110 If voters can switch parties when another party offers a platform 
that satisfies more of their policy preferences,111 then a party disadvantaged by partisan 
gerrymandering can simply adjust its policies to appeal to marginal chunks of the electorate,112 
thereby defeating the thin majorities that a gerrymandering will tend to secure.113 The threat from 
spoiler conditions, meanwhile, is mitigated by the asserted savviness of parties (which would 
                                                 
107 While the politics of the Court have shifted since Bandemer, this article will refer to the anti-justiciability position 
as ‘conservative’ for all of the Supreme Court jurisprudence. Furthermore, Kennedy’s Vieth concurrence will be 
discussed here, despite its ambiguous status. 
108 Bandemer, 478 at 156, 160 (O’Connor, J., concurring); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 420 (rejecting a particular test for 
violations of fairness in representation on the grounds that it hangs on assumptions upon shifting voter preference). 
See also Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229, at 75 (Griesbach, dissenting) (citing Bandemer and Vieth to support the point 
that a party victimized by a gerrymander may nonetheless convince voters who were identified by the gerrymandering 
party as members of that dominant matter to flip allegiances, thereby thwarting the intentions of the gerrymander; this 
logic is the functional linchpin of that provided in Sections II and III infra, as such conduct by both parties and voters 
is central to effective representation). 
109 “[M]embers of the Democratic and Republican Parties cannot claim they are a discrete and insular group vulnerable 
to exclusion from the political process by some dominant group: these political parties are the dominant groups, and 
the Court has offered no reason to believe that they are incapable of fending for themselves through the political 
process.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152. (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285-86 (boundary line 
drawing is a “root-and-branch matter of politics”, making it impossible to identify when there is ‘too much’ politics 
in legislative matters regarding politics). 
110 The conservatives in particular seem concerned with the fact that the argument voter rights are impaired must be 
balanced against the fact that judicial nullification of a districting plan will result in the Court “fundamental political 
choice”110 for the electorate. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286-88. This idea draws on the point that districtings reflect legislative 
decisions based on democratic outcomes, and that for the Court to reject them is to effect rule from the bench; 
enforcement of a right to partisan identity, in the conservative view, is far from costless.  
111 This may be most plainly described id. at 287-288, using the example of candidate competence as a policy 
preference.  
112 Id. at 287; Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 160 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (on the importance of attracting independent 
voters to achieve electoral victory). 
113 Id. at 152-53 (characterizing political gerrymandering as a “self-limiting enterprise”). Indeed, the fundamental 
structural dispute in Bandemer may be if political gerrymandering is always self-limiting (in which case the question 
should never be justiciable) as opposed to self-limiting only under certain conditions (in which case the Courts will 
need to step in when those conditions don’t apply). Cf. id. at 152 (O’Connor, J., concurring) always self-limiting) with 
id. at 126 (not always). Justice Breyer’s dissent in Vieth, 541 U.S. at 355-360, offers one of the more reflective analyses 
of when such practice might be identified as self-limiting, or not. Interestingly, the Vieth plurality makes significantly 
less use of this fact, instead preferring to attack the idea that there is a right to proportional representation for attributes 
such as partisan affiliation. 541 U.S. at 289-90. 
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presumably manifest, inter alia, in their ability to effectively adapt to appeal to marginal voters) 
and pliability of voters (which would result in their receptiveness to appeals from the competing 
party).  
Thus, underlying the conservative position is a set of implicit assertions regarding spoilers: 
that voters tend to have weak enough P values and partisan identities tend to be fluid enough such 
that political actors can readily respond to politicized districting; and that substantive preferences 
are arranged such that there is meaningful room for adjustment and political competition. 
Consequently, courts are ill-positioned to intervene, because the drawing of politicized district 
lines itself is not the cause of harm to representative capacity. That depends on substantive political 
characteristics which conservatives do not think courts can reliably police.114 In short, voter 
partisan identity is too unstable a characteristic upon which to found a judicially enforceable right.  
This supports a broader conservative confidence in the ability of political actors – to 
navigate the impact of politicized line drawing. Indeed, the conservative views of political 
competence, and their skepticism regarding the justiciability of political rights based in districting, 
are complementary. Because conservatives assume political competence will typically negate any 
prospective harm from partisan gerrymandering, and the judiciary is ill-positioned to ascertain 
when spoiler conditions do exist, courts cannot intervene to protect voter rights against partisan 
gerrymandering in an organized way.115  
                                                 
114 See id. at 286 (it is impossible to say when there is “too much” politics in a districting). See also Bandemer, 478 
U.S. at 153 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (on the impossibility of eliminating politics from the districting). LULAC 
contains an interesting corollary to this, related to the intent rather than effect: If, as the conservatives in Vieth assert, 
partisanship is inevitable in districting and determining how much partisan intentionality is an unmanageable line-
drawing exercise, then (even if one concedes prospective justiciability, as does Kennedy) even “bloodfeud” 
intentionality is not enough without some tangible negative impact, evidently missing in LULAC (at least at the 
moment of the election and without use of an exotic metric such as partisan symmetry). 548 U.S. at 456. 
115 This statement is probably a clearer restatement of the various claims from Vieth and Bandemer that it is impossible 
to know how much politics is too much. 
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b. The liberal treatment of spoilers  
The liberal treatment of spoilers is generally (though not categorically)116 structured around 
an analogy of party identity to race. This parallel tends to be embedded in liberal reasoning rather 
than explicitly stated117 – it would be absurd to claim that party affiliations and platforms are as 
firmly set as racial identities. Yet liberals tend to posit a fixedness of partisan identity,118 implying 
that voters cannot shift parties readily or easily, and that parties cannot make material adjustments 
to their platforms to remain competitive. Without the possibility of ready adaptation, politicized 
districting is a source of systemic and individual injustice, harming collective preferences and 
individual voting power.  
The liberals do not clearly articulate the basis of partisan identity’s similarity to race. Yet 
as described above, race can be the source of powerful partisan loyalty as well as a divisive wedge 
issue. If party identity necessarily has these traits, politicized districting will harm both the efficacy 
of representation and the rights of individual voters. Yet such intrinsic harm is only possible if 
partisanship is sufficiently firm such that adaptation cannot overcome districting, (the first spoiler 
condition); or if voter preferences and identities are arranged such that voters fall into necessarily 
oppositional blocks (the second spoiler condition). Yet the liberal implication that party identity 
                                                 
116 Breyer in particular avoids analogizing to race in his Vieth dissent, 541 U.S. at 360, but as a result his approach has 
a quality of generality similar to the Bandemer plurality test. 
117 The Bandemer plurality offers probably the most circumspect and legally cautious approach to this: “[T]hat the 
claim is submitted by a political group, rather than a racial group does not distinguish it in terms of justiciability.” 
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 125. See also id. at 130-31. The Powell dissent in Bandemer and the Vieth dissents tend to be 
more aggressive in analogizing to race. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 164 (pointing to Karcher v. Daggett to suggest that 
any disfavoring of a ‘weak’ community group is a constitutional violation) (Powell, J., dissenting); Vieth, 541 U.S. at 
320 (pointing to dicta in Gaffney to support the idea that racial and political discrimination are equivalently illicit), 
337-38 (a political gerrymander is as objectionable as a racial gerrymander) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Vieth, 541 U.S. 
at 344 (observing that excessive presence of both race or partisanship can render a districting plan illicit) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). See also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 469-470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (treating party affiliation as stable and 
analogizing to cases on racial gerrymandering to under discriminatory effect on Democrats). 
118 See, e.g. Bandemer 478 U.S. at 165-66; Vieth, 541 U.S. at 347 (discrimination by the dominant party against any 
“different but politically coherent group” should be suspect) (Souter dissent). See also Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229 
at 40, referring to “cutting out for the longterm those of a particular political affiliation”. These all presume that a  
districting that is illicit because it harms a voter on account of partisan affiliation has definitiveness in the affiliation. 
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possesses these characteristics is as much a substantive assumption as the conservative assertion 
regarding its adaptation and fluidity.  
This analysis reveals that both the conservative and liberal positions on the justiciability of 
partisan gerrymandering hang on foundational assumptions. The justices are, in effect, divided on 
whether the Court can effectively assess and intervene when spoiler conditions adhere. The ardent 
conservatives suggest that the spoilers are not present with such consistent transparency so as to 
enable judicial intervention. The Bandemer plurality, Breyer, and, with great tentativeness, 
Kennedy, suggest that when use of partisan interest in districting is sufficiently egregious (that is, 
these conditions are present to a strong enough degree), the efficacy of representation will be 
compromised. The remaining liberal justices appear willing to presume the presence of these 
spoiler conditions whenever partisan self-interest dictates line-drawing. 
 The difficulty, however, is that the presence of these spoilers cannot be treated as anything 
other than substantive political realities, and resolving the justiciability debate can only be 
appropriately done through such a substantive political inquiry. In phrasing their analysis in the 
traditional terms of constitutional analysis – equal protection from vote dilution and rights to 
association, all occurring in the context of district line-drawing – the justices evade the substantive 
political nature of the partisan gerrymandering debate.  
2. Spoiler conditions and the legal literature 
Spoiler conditions also provide a helpful perspective on innovative approaches to election 
law. This section reviews how spoilers provide a framework that can organize and clarify the 
literature on partisan gerrymandering. 
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a. Competitive elections as political markets 
The most comprehensive theory of American election law is the markets-and-lockups 
theory advanced by Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela Karlan, and Rick Pildes.119 They emphasize that 
elections should prioritize robust political competition, a goal that can be obscured by a focus on 
a rigidly doctrinal framework.120 In this view, partisan gerrymandering is not an intrinsic evil; 
rather the Court should evaluate the practice in the course of a broader policing of political 
accountability. The greatest hazard to representation is that those who currently hold power will 
entrench themselves through manipulating electoral structures and practices.121 
The concern raised by these authors is the same at the heart of this Article. Indeed, they 
suggest – but do not fully develop – a theory sympathetic to the one in this Article: that partisan 
gerrymandering might benefit representation through creative destruction.122 The authors focus on 
competition between candidates as the sine qua non of functional elections. If voters know their 
preferences and accordingly select representatives who will advance policies that serves those 
preferences, structures and mechanisms that impede open candidate competition have the same 
character as the ‘spoiler’ conditions identified above. Much as the spoiler conditions prevent 
effective adaptation in response to partisan gerrymandering, misuse of political structures allows 
                                                 
119 A related structure-oriented approach is advanced by Gerken, supra note 19, at 530, which emphasizes the difficulty 
the Court suffers in trying to interpret wrongs that go to systemic electoral setups in individual rights terms. While 
Gerken does not focus on lack of competition as the specific indicator of electoral ills, her structural approach can be 
understood as a related attempt to use a high-level concept to bring order to the law. The spoiler understanding of 
partisan gerrymandering fits well with her theory, insofar as it demonstrates that politicized districting ultimately 
reflects substantive defects in politics rather than discrete infringement of individual rights. 
120 For the general articulation of this theory, see, e.g., see Issacharoff and Pildes, supra note 17; for its specific 
application to partisan gerrymandering and how judicial intervention should focus on competition rather than narrow 
doctrinal queries, see Issacharoff and Karlan, supra note 10, at 570; Issacharoff, supra note 9. 
121 This implies, of course, that these authors would condemn certain clear statements the Court has made, such as the 
suggestion in Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 738, that there is no harm where a bipartisan agreement results in proportional 
partisan allocation of seats. 
122 Issacharoff and Karlan, supra note 10, at 543 (“to the extent that the Court's intervention [to stop partisan 
gerrymandering] is prompted by claims of excessive partisanship, it may actually encourage further reductions in 
political competition.”).  
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representatives and elites to prevent elections from serving as an effective marketplace for voter 
choice. 
Insofar as this Article intersects the politics-as-markets theory, it argues that partisan 
districting in isolation cannot be a basis for incumbent protection, insofar as adaptation should 
allow voters as well as parties to react to new constituencies. This is not to say that in practice 
partisan gerrymanders cannot be one of the tools in the toolkit of deviously entrenching elites, but 
because the lockup must exploit some other feature of the political ecosystem (or merely be the 
implementation of some deeper structural element that permits elites to deny access to rank-and-
file choice), it cannot be first-order responsible. Those independent structural attributes are distinct 
from the effects of partisan gerrymandering (and thus conceptually parallel to spoiler conditions). 
Therefore, under a lockup theory it should be any true competition-impeding features of a political 
system that is the target, rather than partisan gerrymandering. Moreover, were partisan 
gerrymandering to be deemed justiciable, it would require a mechanism that explained how these 
ills exploited partisan gerrymandering. As discussed infra, the courts should be reticent to 
intercede in such substantive features particularly where party formation – part of the very 
battlefield of politics – is concerned.  
b. The First Amendment and partisan gerrymandering 
Arguments that associational rights solve the justiciability puzzle for partisan 
gerrymandering face a similar challenge.123 The redrawing of district lines does not itself obstruct 
the ability of citizens to engage in the formation or coordination of political associations. If 
                                                 
123 See Shapiro, 2016 WL 4445320, at 17-18 (Bredar, D.J., dissenting) (arguing that the partisan gerrymandering does 
not infringe the type of First Amendment associational rights that in manner germane to the type of conduct such 
rights are meant to protect, because partisan gerrymandering does not impair voters’ ability to “affiliate with the party 
of their choice, to vote, to run for office if they wish, and to participate in vibrant political debate wherever they find 
themselves”).  
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variations of preferences among voters were homogeneously distributed, then it could have no 
harmful associational effects, and the efficient adaptation process would simply produce new 
coalitions. The presence of spoiler conditions, however, could reduce the efficacy of associations 
after a politicized districting, because the gerrymander would artificial bunch voters so as to inhibit 
their ‘natural’ associations. Yet insofar as gerrymandering inflicts a unique harm to associations, 
it can be traced to the same substantive spoiler conditions for partisan gerrymandering generally: 
either strong partisan affiliations that make rejiggering associations costly, or bundling of 
preferences that entail voters cannot form coalitions that are as effective if they have been 
reallocated with politics in mind.  
Yet the associational right is not a guarantee that a given arrangement of voters (that is to 
say, ones with strong partisan loyalty or a certain blocks of preferences) will have a protected level 
of political power.124 In effect, it would insulate those who possessed certain fluid political 
characteristics from the need to engage in the adaptation process by which parties and voters fight 
for power and maintain political relevance. Such protection would make the associational right a 
constitutional guarantee that coalitions of voters do not need to react to shifting circumstances that 
are themselves political in origin. It would thus use the right to association to protect a given group 
defined only by its political identity from the need to engage in substantive politics. Such a 
protection might ultimately require defending a principle of proportional representation, a 
substantive political conclusion beyond the judicial mandate.125 Again, as discussed infra, such 
judicial intervention in the very struggle that produces political coalitions and political identities 
                                                 
124 Cf. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 131-32 (rejecting the idea that the Court must protect certain levels of political power 
for groups). 
125 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 288; see also Schuck, supra note 12, at 1350; Persily, supra note 12 at 650 (proportional 
representation not necessarily the only just option in a first-past-the-post-system). Cf. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 337 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (generally agreeing, but adopting a softer view towards the idea that preserving proportional 
representation might be a valid objective). 
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is interference with the very process of political decision-making, and thus should be approached 
with great suspicion.  
c. Quantitative metrics and justiciability 
Another approach to partisan gerrymandering that has been in vogue of late focuses on 
solving the justiciability challenge by offering quantitative metrics. The “efficiency gap” metric 
advanced by Nick Stephanopolous has so far gained the most traction as a manageable standard, 
being favorably discussed by the majority opinion in Whitford v. Gill.126 The efficiency gap 
updates127 the partisan symmetry test that was advanced – but failed to convince a majority, 
including Justice Kennedy – in LULAC.128  
The analysis of this Article, however, has demonstrated that these assays confuse a 
symptom of pernicious partisan gerrymandering with its necessary underlying cause. Partisan 
gerrymandering can, under certain conditions, cause political harm – but that political harm is 
necessarily due to substantive political realities, and it is the Court’s decision to engage with these 
substantive political realities that must guide the justiciability analysis. The most notorious of those 
political realities, racial prejudice, enjoys constitutional mandates that, inter alia, attempt to 
prevent it from operating as a spoiler in the districting process. Numerical tests that focus on 
partisan identity may prove useful as indicia of other harm, but they can do no more than offer 
correlative evidence, and they shed little light unless it is clear what is being tested for.129 
Ultimately, this can be tracked back to the nature of partisan identity as ultimately instrumental, 
and the need for ‘spoiler’ conditions to make partisan gerrymandering actually harmful. 
                                                 
126 2016 WL 6837229, at 50.  
127 Stephanopolous, supra note 4, at 855-57 (comparing the efficiency gap to partisan symmetry). 
128 548 U.S. at 419-421 (describing the features and insufficiency of the partisan symmetry test advanced by amici 
Gary King); but see id. at 466-67 (summarizing the literature on partisan symmetry and describing it as “widely 
accepted by scholars providing a measure of partisan fairness in electoral systems).  
129 The analysis of this article, therefore, challenges the view presented by Hasen, supra note 4, that perhaps judicial 
intervention to prevent racial discrimination is effectively served by  
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IV. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN BROKEN POLITIES 
If partisan gerrymandering is only a problem on account of underlying conditions, why 
have litigants, the liberal branch of the Court, and many academics persistently treated it as a 
malady that should be addressed as an intrinsic evil? Given that partisan gerrymandering can be 
exploited as such a tool for partisan advantage when such circumstances exist, but that under 
normal circumstances any harmful effects are neutralized by political adaptation, ought the courts 
to intervene? Why has identifying an independent constitutional wrong in the practice of partisan 
gerrymandering proven so seductive, if it can only be abused as a vehicle for exploiting deeper 
political factors? This section addresses these questions, focusing on the hazard of careless judicial 
bushwhacking through the political thicket. If the courts engage with partisan gerrymandering 
(whose pathologies are better identified as symptomatic, rather than causal, of electoral 
dysfunction) without sensitivity to underlying causal ills, invalidation of legislative districting 
could elicit backlash against excessive judicial intervention. The possibility of this is greatly 
exacerbated by the tendency of litigants and critics to evade discussion of the underlying 
pathologies that can make party-based districting problematic.  
A. Fair Process, Substantive Politics and Judicial Intervention 
The features courts unequivocally demand of a districting – that it respect one-person one-
vote and face strict scrutiny in considerations of race – reflect either bedrock conditions of 
democratic fairness130 or explicit constitutional instructions to restrict consideration of certain 
types of immutable characteristics.131 This Article has explored how districting by partisan identity 
                                                 
130 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565-66 (1964) (“achieving fair and effective representation is concededly the basic 
aim of legislative apportionment”).  
131 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642 (prohibition against “redistricting legislative that is so extremely irregular on its face that it 
rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for the purposes of voting, without regard for 
traditional districting principles and without sufficiently compelling justification.”).  
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is conceptually and practically distinct, thanks to the capacity of political actors to adjust party 
identity. A question is whether consideration of party identity should none the less be prohibited 
by the courts. The most aggressive constitutional approach to districting (articulated in the Souter 
Vieth dissent) would simply prohibit attacks on any “politically coherent group whose members 
engaged in block voting” 132 through districting, in effect generalizing the equal protection 
principle currently applied to race. 
However, even if one adopts the Souter approach and concludes districting should not be 
permitted to harm defined blocks of voters, there are reasons to treat judicial protection of party 
identity with cautious skepticism. Unlike other types of group commitments, party identity is an 
intermediary by which voters engage with politics, rather than an end of politics itself.133 For courts 
to intervene in the process by which voters make instrumental decisions on how to advance their 
substantive preferences is both suspect as a democratic act, and potentially distortive of the 
unfolding of electorate-guided political outcomes. 
This is not to say that courts cannot enter the political thicket in order to defend process. 
Indeed, this was precisely the basis on which the Court entered the thicket to protect one-person 
one-vote, which is a bedrock commitment of egalitarian democratic practice. However, this Article 
has shown that partisan gerrymandering is neither like a violation of one-person one-vote in 
principle (because voters can adapt their partisan identities to retain political relevance) or effect 
(because it can prove explicitly beneficial to expression of democratic will through creative 
destruction of existing coalitions).  
                                                 
132 541 U.S. at 347. 
133 It is thus part of the process, and specifically part of the process by which voters establish their priorities and 
commitments in a first-past-the-post system. See Kang, supra note 49; see generally supra note 50.  
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The analysis of spoilers, of course, shows that adaptation will not always render partisan 
gerrymandering harmless in terms of voter preference satisfaction. Yet the spoilers themselves are 
the expression of substantive political conditions.134 These conditions may justify separate types 
of judicial intervention, particularly if there is an independent failure in democratic process135 or a 
vulnerable group’s access to politics is harmed.136 Yet to deem partisan gerrymandering illegal by 
default comprises subtle judicial intervention in a central process by which citizens coordinate 
their political activities. Judicial nullification of districting solely because districts are too partisan 
constrains the terms of citizen political engagement.137 
If courts intervene to shape the substantive terms of political participation (as they would 
to protect party identities, whether related to partisan loyalty or preference bundling), they 
necessarily set a baseline138 regarding general terms of how citizens organize politically. The 
resulting political coalitions are outputs of democratic autonomy that should lie beyond the ken of 
judicial review.139 This point is elucidated the nature of the spoilers responsible for the pathologies 
                                                 
134 Some would argue that the current state of extreme polarization makes these conditions particularly exigent. See 
generally Muirhead, supra note 49, Rosenblum, supra note 49; cf. Schuck, supra note 12, at 1372 (arguing that by the 
mid-1980s partisan affiliation had declined, and could be expected to decline further, a claim evidently falsified by 
current levels of partisan fragmentation). Yet polarization is precisely the type of problem of autonomous politics that 
courts are ill-suited to manage, insofar as it requires the courts to decide optimal political arrangements for ‘good’ 
political attitudes. See id. at 1380.  
135 The idea such process failure underlies the competition theorists, Section III.B.2.a supra. See also Ely, supra note 
11, at 101 (describing the Constitution as protecting processes rather than outcomes). 
136 This is most famously captured in U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also Ely, supra 
note 11, at 75-76. 
137 This challenges that the argument offered by Hasen, supra note 4 at 36, and that he imputes to Issacharoff, that 
the ballot-access-protecting measures that should be used to prevent racial and partisan discrimination against ballot 
access should be expanded to include gerrymandering, because district composition is inherently neutral, and only 
evil through the impact of other ills. 
138 See Elhauge, supra note 93; Levinson and Sachs, supra note 2, at 460; Charles, supra note 68, at 660; cf. Klarman, 
supra note 2, at 533-34 (observing the baseline argument of critics of judicial involvement, but arguing that the clearly 
illicit motive of partisan gerrymandering makes it susceptible to procedural solutions). If this baseline question were 
to be meaningfully phrased (which well might be a precondition to generating a coherent jurisprudence of partisan 
gerrymandering), it might be as follows: is there is a right to participate in a party whose ideological program has been 
formed free from ‘exogenous’ influences? 
139 See Ely, supra note 11, at 101 (the Constitution protects process, not ideologies). The factors that can make partisan 
gerrymandering pathological are part of the substantive outcomes of politics, not its process. See generally LARRY 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 8 (2005). Thus partisan 
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of partisan gerrymandering. Strong partisan affiliation ultimately reflects a choice on behalf of 
voters, whether political actors choose to prioritize maintaining their partisan identities (whether 
by refusing to contemplate negotiation to join the opposition party, or refusing to compromise on 
a party platform to tempt crossover voters). If autonomy is the core of democratic governance, this 
decision to avoid softening party identity in the face of disadvantageous conditions should be 
treated as a free choice, rather than the basis for judicial intervention. Likewise, insofar as 
preference bundling reflects the freely chosen preferences of voters, for the Courts to dictate that 
certain configurations of preference bundles should have a privileged status against the vagaries 
of circumstance is to intervene in the “root and branch”140 conflict of democratic politics. To 
identify either partisan identity or preference bundling as a quality that must be protected to ensure 
fair representation is to make the category error of confusing neutral process (which can justify 
judicial intervention automatically since Baker) and substantive political preference (which 
requires an exceptional justification for the judicial hijacking of democratic will).141 
As this Article has already conceded (and the very term spoiler denotes), partisan 
allegiance and preference bundling, as well as structural factors that independently impair 
adaptation,142 can all mean that politicized redistricting can be an intermediary for impairing 
                                                 
gerrymandering does not need to be policed by the courts in order to ensure “the equal freedom and independence” of 
citizens that are central to democracy. Samuel Freeman, Constitutional Democracy and the Legitimacy of Judicial 
Review, 9 Law & Phil. 327, 328 (1990). 
140 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 285. 
141 While this Article suggests that partisan gerrymandering is not an ill on the terms suggested by reformers, its 
conclusions do not condemn the use of alternative districting mechanisms (so long as such alternatives are selected 
by democratic process). Thus Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S.Ct 
2652 (2015) seems correctly decided, particularly given the independent mechanism arose from a ballot initiative. 
However, this Article would challenge certain vindications of such mechanisms, in particular that they inherently 
improve democratic process. Others have observed aspects of these problems with regards to redistricting 
commissions. See generally Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L. J. 
1808, 1837 (2012) (“A truly bipartisan structure risks the prospect of stalemate and an incumbent gerrymander, but 
using independent members to break partisan deadlock can feed the perception of hidden bias.”). Cf. Nicholas O. 
Stephanopoulos, Arizona and Anti-Reform, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 477 (2015). 
142 See supra Section III.B.2.a. 
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democratic efficacy. In each of these cases, however, there is a prior and independent condition 
that renders the districting process pathological by impairing the adaptation process. Particularly 
in light of the prospective benefits of partisan gerrymandering, courts should be leery of placing 
partisan identity in the category of rights that can be harmed by districting. Rather, courts should 
prefer to address the underlying substantive factors that are causally responsible for the political 
wrong. Indeed, the constitutional instruction to strictly scrutinize race in districting is just such an 
instruction, preventing it from acting as a wedge issue that can be used to harm minorities through 
districting.143 
B. Justiciability and Testing for Substantive Political Harm 
If courts deem some partisan gerrymanders illegal, it must not just be on the basis that they 
reflect “too much” politics144 even over a prolonged period.145 Rather, to avoid invading the 
domain of democratic choice, the Court must tie the nullification of a partisan gerrymander to the 
underlying substantive logic that makes the given districting pathological. As described above, 
one such possibility is that a partisan gerrymander is merely a proxy for harming another, first-
order, and functionally immutable attribute, such that adaptation by the harmed group is 
impossible. It is critical to differentiate strong partisan attachment that can be attributed to such a 
wedge group characteristic from purely ‘sentimental’ attachment to a particular partisan identity, 
which is the domain of political choice and thus inappropriate for judicial intervention. Another is 
the possibility of “bundled preferences” amongst the electorate such that no meaningful adaptation 
can take place. A third possibility is that partisan gerrymandering might be a vehicle for anti-
democratic practices distinct from a districting itself. In this case there would be other structural 
                                                 
143 See supra Section III.A.3. 
144 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286, 296. 
145 This makes the efficiency gap and partisan symmetry tests insufficient by themselves, as they must be tied to a 
deeper theory of legitimacy political process. 
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factors – such as elite domination of internal party dynamics – that make it possible to exploit 
spoiler conditions districting to impair fairness.146  
Any such a test would need to look at both the districting itself as well as the underlying 
political circumstances, and thus have far more sophistication than the novel tests for justiciability 
suggested147 or implemented.148 Each of the three possibilities (harm to an immutable attribute; 
bundled preferences; and use as a tool of elite domination) identified above might be sufficient 
alone to prospectively make a politicized districting illicit, but intersections of the factors might 
serve to be mutually reinforcing. Courts would be required to engage in intensive fact-finding 
regarding underlying political conditions and then make an assessment regarding the impact of 
these political conditions upon the effect of a districting.149 As this would need to occur on a case 
by case basis, each litigation would impose a tremendous burden on the courts, and test the limits 
of judicial competence.  
The complexity of the test should generate further caution regarding the justiciability of 
partisan gerrymandering. Intervention in partisan gerrymandering not only requires intervention 
in a core process of democratic preference formation, but requires the court to make nuanced case-
by-case judgments regarding local political conditions. That courts would have to so assess 
political conditions heightens risks that judging partisan gerrymandering will cross into 
                                                 
146 This must ultimately the foundation of the ‘lockup’ theory described by Issacharoff, Karlan, and Pildes described 
passim. See Section III.B.2.a. 
147 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 339 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (the Shaw test should be applied to enquire into if neutral principles 
were ignored); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting) (apply a burden-shifting test derived from McDonnell); Id. at 365 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (identify unjustified entrenchment). The Stevens and Souter tests barrel through the possibility 
that partisan gerrymandering is a dependent harm; Breyer’s test allows for more fluidity, but offers little more 
specificity than the Bandemer plurality’s test.  
148 Whitford, 2016 WL 6837229, at 35 (offering a test based on “severe impediments to the effectiveness of the votes”, 
yet failing to unpack upon what deeper features that impediment subsists). 
149 See Jesse H. Choper, The Political Question Doctrine: Suggested Criteria, 54 DUKE L. J. 1457, 1489 (2005) 
(conceding that political gerrymandering “may be one of those contexts in which the judicial branch cannot develop 
effective safeguards for individual rights”, though later arguing that it should be possible to adopt some principle). 
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paternalism. While the courts might try to use neutral criteria to judge when such specific political 
conditions are troubling, it is a difficult zone to create a clear and universal test. These all evoke 
basic concerns of the political question doctrine. 
As partisan gerrymandering becomes a harmful practice only where it is founded in 
problematic features of the electorate’s substantive political investments, it may be safer to leave 
its correction to the “aroused popular conscience”150 of voters. Nullification of districting of 
partisan gerrymandering alone can only indict underlying structural injustices. It would be both 
more transparent and more efficacious for the Court to address such injustices directly, and thus 
avoid claims of surreptitious meddling in popular control of democratic outcomes. 
C. Unintended Consequences of Judicial Intervention 
The idealized assumptions upon which this Article operates, however, must face a 
challenge based in exigent political realities: partisan gerrymandering is used by parties to entrench 
themselves, often at a cost to traditionally disadvantaged groups.151 In light of this, theorized 
arguments regarding the hypothetical capacity of voters and parties to adapt to politicized 
districting ought to be set aside; and any opportunity for the courts to intervene for the sake of 
justice ought to be taken.  
The superficial appeal of this claim to practical necessity should not alleviate the fragility 
of the case for judicial intervention against partisan gerrymandering. The legacy of the Court’s 
judicial intervention to prevent substantive ills – rather than merely protect fairness of and access 
to process – is a dubious one. If the adaptability of parties and partisan identity is conceded, one 
                                                 
150 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (Burger, dissenting) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 270 (Frankfurter, dissenting)). 
151 See Michael C. Li and Thomas P. Wolf, Court should outlaw drawing of political maps based on parties, 
NEWSDAY, Dec. 7, 2016, available at http://www.newsday.com/opinion/oped/court-should-outlaw-drawing-of-
political-maps-based-on-parties-1.12718137 (two leading figures in the fight to make partisan gerrymandering 
justiciable argue for the convergence between race and party); Hasen, supra note 103, at 69 (observing that attacks on 
the Democratic party will also tend to be attacks on minority voters).  
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could characterize judicial interdiction of partisan gerrymandering as a type of public-law 
Lochnerism.152 Lochner153 (now “infamous and discredited”)154 deemed legislative action taken 
by elected representatives that structured private sector relations an illicit intrusion upon individual 
rights. This was seen as treating as enforcing a “prepolitical” baseline of wealth redistribution.155 
Likewise, striking down legislature-born districting plans on the grounds that they involve partisan 
gerrymanders might be identified as treating a given allocation of districts as likewise sacrosanct.  
Yet if voters and parties can adapt to remain competitive, and explicit constitutional 
protections exist to protect the concededly vulnerable (racial minorities), then judicial intervention 
does no more than enforce an arbitrary baseline. Indeed, if anything the principles of Lochner cut 
more strongly against partisan gerrymandering, insofar as districting itself falls within the realm 
of public electoral contestation, thus presumably creating a reason for doubting the need for 
judicial review. More recently, scholars have begun to question judicial programs that impose 
social norms in the face of legislative action, even that those that appear more sympathetic to a 
progressive agenda. In particular, some have argued that decisions advancing racial rights, most 
notably Brown v. Board of Education, have actually had the effect of producing a popular political 
backlash. The modest gains generated by the Court-led action were undermined by long-
simmering, and ultimately corrosive, effects of popular resentment. Scholars have suggested this 
is a broader pattern when the judiciary attempts to serve as the aggressive vanguard of social 
values.156 The drawing of districts may not be the type of typical wedge issue that would have such 
backlash; moreover, some might argue it is precisely the type of representative self-dealing that 
                                                 
152 See Cass R. Sunstein, Political Equality and Unintended Consequence, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1390, 1397 (1994). 
Sunstein compares Lochner to Buckley, insofar as that Buckley delimited government regulation of a type of good. 
153 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
154 Sunstein, supra note 152, at 1397. 
155 Id.  
156 See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST 81 
(1994); Post and Siegal, supra note 88. 
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justifies judicial intervention.157 Yet the structural argument of this article is that the harm from 
partisan gerrymandering must come from the substantive political commitments of an electorate. 
Thus, while it may not elicit first-order backlash, like these more facially invidious issues, it should 
perhaps be left as a democratic feature to be politically resolved. 
Proponents of general judicial nullification of partisan gerrymandering might argue that 
the Court irrevocably entered the political thicket with Baker v. Carr, and having taken on the 
mantle of ensuring fair elections through judicial innovation, it should do so with consistency. Yet 
this ignores the basic structural observation that undergirds this Article: districting on account of 
partisan affiliation itself cannot impair individual voter political power, because of the capacity to 
adapt to new constituencies. The right protected in Baker v. Carr established such an individual 
right to equal power. Entry into the political thicket through one person one vote principle can be 
understood as both conceptually tidy and contained within a facial reading of the equal protection 
clause. To establish a right that is infringed by partisan gerrymandering requires extensive 
innovation regarding the relationship between equality and political participation, and only has 
bite with regards to underlying substantive politics. 
More generally, judicial intervention against partisan gerrymandering comprises an 
attempt to dictate appropriate terms of political engagement (by defining the ‘right’ conditions of 
party identity) through elite technocratic instruction from the Court. Yet, unless justified by 
reference to some legal wrong linked to the substantive pathologies that makes partisan 
gerrymandering harmful, such intervention appears to be unalloyed judicial legislation. In 
nullifying politicized districting, the Court necessarily asserts that democracy suffers from 
substantive ills – yet rather than address these problems directly, it attacks a practice that should 
                                                 
157 Klarman, supra note 2, at 533-34.  
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be in principle innocuous. This tempts a backlash against the very inefficacy of the judicial 
measures, or may simply result in churning of district lines by judicial fiat even as the underlying 
political maladies remain untouched. Indeed, if a polity truly has its conscience “seared”158 such 
that it desires an apolitical districting mechanism, it has resources to ensure neutral bodies draw 
district lines. An electorate can either elect representatives who make creation of such a body a 
policy priority (and eject those who do not cooperate from office), or use plebiscite mechanisms 
to adopt such a body.159 While more political costly or involved, such processes rely on democratic 
processes to set future democratic process. 
A lesson may be drawn here from the impact of the judicial regulation of racial districting. 
Unlike partisanship, race has an incontrovertible legacy as a source of material oppression of the 
disadvantaged. Yet racial districting itself is not the ill – it is the fact that certain district shapes 
can be used to further the racial animus held by dominant blocks in a polity. Districting is regulated 
by the Court to ensure that it does not become an ostensibly useful mechanism for harming a group, 
and thereby serving as the vehicle for illicit preferences. Yet some have argued that the continued 
judicial policing of race in districting has actually served to marginalize minority voters and 
impaired democratic development.160 In a similar fashion, this Article suggests that judicial 
intervention in partisan gerrymandering might have perverse impacts, concealing the true 
problems of representation and political fairness. It thus distracts both activists, political entity, 
and the judiciary from the substantive hazards in the political thicket that are worthy of attention. 
                                                 
158 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (Burger, C. J., concurring). 
159 Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S.Ct 2652 (2015). 
160 See Pildes, supra note 23, at 1571 (observing the perverse effects of the VRA Section 2 requirement in the context 
of Shaw); Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1710, 1731 (suggesting that the continued judicial monitoring of racialized voting may be impairing emergence of a 
holistic political dynamic); Steven Hill, How the Voting Right Act Hurts Democrats and Minorities,  THE ATLANTIC, 
June 17, 2013, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/06/how-the-voting-rights-act-hurts-
democrats-and-minorities/276893/. Of course, in light of Shelby, some of these questions may be tested in practice. 
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CONCLUSION 
Anxiety regarding the procedures of representation inevitably brushes against concerns 
regarding the real outcomes of elections and policies derived from democratic will.161 Judicial 
oversight of elections encounters this tension when protecting “fair representation” while 
refraining from legislating from the bench. This Article demonstrates that partisan gerrymandering 
alone does not comprise a procedural failure that deprives voters of representative efficacy.162 
Thus, judicial nullification of district lines purely on the grounds of partisan gerrymandering 
comprises judicial management of political outcomes. Moreover, because party identity is a venue 
of political contestation that constantly evolves in response to the electorate’s preferences, judicial 
nullification of partisan gerrymandering more subtly intrudes upon voter control of the democratic 
process.  
This Article has shown partisan gerrymandering can only serve as an intermediary for the 
expression of other problematic conditions in a democracy, usually related to the configuration of 
electoral preferences or control of party apparatus. It is these complaints that should be the source 
of investigation, and, if appropriate, judicial attention. To litigate partisan gerrymandering on its 
own terms is to quixotically seek to solve deep structural problems by attacking superficial 
symptoms. While the tangibility and crispness of partisan gerrymandering make it seductive as 
both the culprit of undesirable political outcomes and as a practice that can be readily condemned, 
this lure should be resisted. 
                                                 
161 See generally Ely, supra note 11, at 103-104 (differentiating between process and outcome). 
162 See Section II supra. 
